GLOBAL
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Volume Two **Winter 1999-Spring 2000** **Nos.1-2.**

THE IMPORTANCE OF MIGRATION FOR CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

Since the incorporation of Caribbean nations into the external spheres of European mercantilism in the sixteenth century, they have both prospered and suffered under colonialism. They underwent fundamental demographic changes during the plantation era; and their social and economic history is one of successive phases of immigration, emigration, and circulation. These international mobility processes have both transformed the densely settled Caribbean island systems and contributed to their identities. While Caribbean insular economies are now struggling to find appropriate frameworks, the current global shifts and neoliberal restructuring of the Western Hemisphere's international realms do not appear to favor the prospects of small island nations. Migration has invariably been cast as a necessary detriment: as a "safety valve," a "brain drain," an escape, a de-population process, a severing of ties, and a perpetuation of dependency. Rarely has migration been viewed as a strategic necessity and a global process with multi-faceted consequences, many of which are positive. This article assesses some of the challenges faced by the island micro-states of the Caribbean in the current world of macro-structural changes, and it identifies some promising potential progressive "development" avenues . Integral to this assessment is the continuing significance of transnational migration traditions in the lives of the region's people. There are several ways migration and its consequences are likely to contribute to a sustainable future for Caribbean people and places. Far from being a negative outcome of persistent underdevelopment, the impact of migration holds out promise for the twenty-first century.

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1. Introduction

Since the incorporation of the small island Caribbean nations into the external spheres of European mercantilism in the sixteenth century, they have experienced successive phases of immigration, emigration, and circulation which have fundamentally transformed these densely-settled island systems. The Caribbean region has borne witness to exploitative forces including: de-population, re-population, trans-shipment, enslavement, indenturing, plantation excesses, expatriated profits, mercantilism, privateerism, piracy, and plunder. The Caribbean region has been at one time the wealthiest of plantation systems; yet many inhabitants experienced immiseration and impoverishment, prosperity, and bankruptcy. After the fortunes of the sugar boom had left their marks, these "once-rich" islands sank into the mire of underdevelopment, colonial neglect, and general immiseration. Migration was viewed in terms of escape and survival for the fortunate, with those remaining behind left to suffer in the hopeless marginalized situation that many an exhausted island ecology presented.

Following World War II and building upon an awakening of social consciousness among the Caribbean lower-classes, several Caribbean governments attempted post-colonial experimentation in development strategies. However, they were rarely successful in achieving the lofty and principled goals of social justice, equity, and enfranchisement that their political agendas espoused. Neither did economic transformation and economic growth come easily (Conway, 1998a). Currently, neoliberal restructuring of the Western hemisphere poses major challenges for Caribbean islands.

The situation facing the island micro-states of the Caribbean in the contemporary world of macro-structural changes is problematic (Conway, 1998b). Globalization and neoliberalism scarcely favor the periphery, and the Caribbean appears to be highly disadvantaged (Dookeran, 1996; Ramseran, 1989). The negative consequences notwithstanding, I would rather offer an optimistic scenario than bemoan the Caribbean region's shortcomings and limitations. Other studies and contributors have represented the crisis in its starker terms (Aponte Garcia and Gautier Mayoral, 1995; Watson, 1995). In this endeavor, I take heart from the progressive writings of regional scholars, such as Rex Nettleford (1993) and Clive Thomas (1993, 1996, 1998), and recent Caribbeanists' challenges to neoliberalism (see Klak, 1998). Drawing upon evidence of past achievements and noting

island-specific examples of positive action and social capital accumulation, a progressive development agenda is articulated that identifies a set of important dimensions upon which a sustainable future could (should) be forged. Incorporated into this agenda is an assessment of the several ways migration and its consequences have the potential to secure a sustainable future for Caribbean people and places.

Migration is commonly cast as a necessary evil, a "safety valve," a "brain drain," an escape, a de-population process, and a severing of ties. Rarely is migration viewed as a strategic necessity and as a process with multi-faceted consequences, many of which are positive. A review of regional Caribbean history records supports the well-founded observation that migration has been a fundamental force in the creation and sustenance of Caribbean societies (Conway, 1989, 1997). Subsequently, with a focus on the future development for the region's microstates, an answer is provided to the article's rhetorical question of why and how migration is important for Caribbean development today, and tomorrow?

2. Migration is the Caribbean's Fundamental Force

From the inception of their emigration and settlement, Caribbean people have encountered internal and external political and socioeconomic forces. Additionally, environmental hazards have exacerbated the conditions which have structured their opportunities to be mobile. With the majority denied access to land as a critical means of survival and protection, Caribbean people have always been, and still are, divorced from an indigenous ecological tradition. Adaptation to change, whether it was the early incorporation of the island economies into European colonial economic dependency, later responses to the oscillations of economic cycles and the vicissitudes of ecological pressures, or hegemonic dominance of United States' capitalist adventurism in the region—this latter penetration exacerbated by political and military adventurism by successive U.S. administrations—has always been a necessary condition for individual survival. Adaptation to the vagaries and destruction of tropical hurricanes, droughts, and even volcanic eruptions has added to the uncertainties of Caribbean existence for the masses (Richardson, 1992). As Richardson (1983) and Carnegie (1982) have so eloquently argued, "individual strength," combined with "strategic flexibility," characterizes the successful adapters in the Caribbean.

Under slavery, the Caribbean black majority was forcibly detained, and any mobility was dictated by their masters or on behalf of the plantocracy. Escape, an exceptionally high-risk option, did at least have an abiding "demonstration effect" and most certainly initiated the tradition to "flee the plantation " once emancipation was a reality. The birth of an emigration tradition for the Caribbean rural under-classes, therefore, can be attributed to this plantation-slavery experience. After emancipation, local circulation patterns would ensue as the still disenfranchised

ex-plantation workers sought alternative means of livelihood, access to land, or non-rural job opportunities in the burgeoning commercial and administrative capitals of their island colonies. Re-settlement in the interior, as pioneer reconstituted peasantry, might have been an alternative for large islanders; but for many in the overcrowded and ecologically-stressed small islands, this internal spatial adjustment was abrogated. For the adventurous in these communities, moving "away from the plantation" necessitated an international movement "off the island."

The role of recruiting agents must be given due recognition in promoting many migration traditions in the Caribbean. Additionally, the institutional mechanisms that prevailed over the lives of Caribbean people are crucial to the explanatory matrix. The colonial administrations served the wishes of metropolitan capital; but local capital was scarcely powerless, and local governmental legislation sometimes intervened in critical ways to stimulate emigration, truncate it, or delay it (Watson, 1982). However, the historical evidence certainly points to the highly significant role that recruiting agents played in convincing Barbadians to undertake contractual sojourns abroad. As returning migrants boasted of their success stories, many recruitment efforts blossomed; and the "demonstration effect" of Panama Money is one such extreme case of this reinforcement (Richardson, 1985).

For other Caribbean residents with more resources, international mobility was already an adaptive strategy. As immigrants, resorting to emigration or return migration could be expected if hardship and failure occurred in the Caribbean. Members of the elite families assumed it was their birthright to "circulate" between home, meaning their European residence or landed estate, and the colonial residence. Schooling and training, marriage opportunities, careers in the military, clergy, or other professions were to be pursued in Europe. Absentee ownership was a manifestation of the transient nature of many elite families' existence in the Caribbean, and the household retainers and estate managers most likely assumed these values either by direct involvement with family members' relocations or by assuming "their betters " expectations were the appropriate norms for their own social position. For the colonial administrative class the Caribbean was also a transient stop. Few established roots, and it was only the succeeding generations of a selective group of this small class of elites who, for one reason or another, failed to realize their intentions to return "home " to France, England, Spain, or Holland and came to view the Caribbean as their adopted home.

Among the "intermediate" ethnic classes, Levantines, Jews, Quakers, Portuguese and Madeirans, to name some of these minorities, retention of their separate identity from the predominantly black under-classes sometimes meant utilizing international mobility, emigration, and circulation as means of maintaining or strengthening their minority alignments. Connections of kin, parallel social practices, and common bases for trading and commercial enterprise (including smuggling) facilitated selective

emigration and international circulation of members of these intermediate minority groups.

Inter-island reciprocity was not solely the domain of immigrant minorities, however. Among those residing in coastal communities' in virtually every Caribbean island, traditions of fishing, inter-island trading, and smuggling evolved from these communities' dependence on marine resources. There was always considerable "small boat " trade and interchange between adjacent islands; and this mercantile tradition lent itself to the encouragement of selective emigration and circulation, when opportunities "off the island" presented themselves to the participants. Inter-island paths established by these time-honored linkages were all potential avenues for development as international mobility paths.

Although international circulation for many of these more-fortunate residents was between their Caribbean homes and other Caribbean territorial enclave communities, some early emigration streams between the region and North American destinations resulted from the reciprocal penetration of private mercantile and commercial interests by North American individuals and companies. This initial link was, however, undertaken by members of the upper-classes and the educated or professional merchant classes. The Caribbean under-classes could not yet consider international mobility as a viable option to their existing debilitating and arduous sustenance activities.

Economic hardship, ecological deterioration of land resource bases, environmental calamities, and the restructuring of the international mercantile and industrial economic system in the late nineteenth century combined to render the Caribbean susceptible to penetration and exploitation by North American capitalist interests. With agents actively recruiting labor in the British West Indies and colonial governments relatively passive in their acceptance of the situation, wage enticements were sufficient to encourage the more adventurous, or the needier and more desperate, to undertake temporary labor contracts overseas in Panama, the Hispanic Caribbean, or farther afield in South America. The resulting emergence of an international circulation tradition among small islanders changed the geographical scale of the opportunity field(s) to encompass extra-regional destinations. The persistence of destitution at home, together with the demonstration effect of successful returnees and the social pressure on those who stayed behind to also demonstrate "success," prompted rapid conversion of this selective strategy to a mass phenomenon.

As the need for a pliable and temporary labor force was proved advantageous to capitalist expansion both in the metropolitan "mother countries" and most-recently in North American agricultural and metropolitan economies, later generations of Caribbean black and poor white under-classes were to receive continuing reinforcement of this circulation strategy.

The social and economic environments in the Caribbean also perpetuated this process. Folk-tradition reinforcement aided and abetted the habit of viewing the outside world as the place of opportunity and advantage. The openness of these insular societies to metropolitan influences, in part reinforced by the cross-currents of movement of Caribbean people, contributed to its maintenance.

The establishment of enclave communities elsewhere in the Caribbean, which logically came about because of emigration and international circulation (when the cyclical return intentions were not realized), widened the social network for future potential movers. Such locationally-spread communities increased over time, and they would become progressively linked by a greater variety and intensity of reciprocal connections—remittances, gifts in kind, information, technology, ideas, and innovations. They would become more diverse and more international as consequent flows of people would increase their participation in, and use of, these social fields (Chapman and Prothero, 1983). The existence of this wider social opportunity structure among Caribbean people in Europe and North America is a contemporary reality most Caribbean scholars accept (Marshall, 1982; Palmer, 1995; Richardson, 1992; Thomas-Hope, 1992). It assumes more significance, however, when viewed as a Pan-Caribbean field within which,

> The choices of small groups and individuals gradually become more intricate and more contingent, as households seek collectively through the act of international circulation to maximize family welfare and to avert risk for family members, and individuals retain the option to operate within the family societal network, or outside it, as opportunistic individuals (adapted from Chapman and Prothero, 1983; Conway, 1986).

The institutional structures of Caribbean countries and of the metropolitan destinations were by no means passive forces in the evolution of these international mobility traditions. International mobility involves action within, or avoidance of, a legislative structure of permission, immigration policies, and practices. One significant temporal situation, which consistently influenced Caribbean overseas movers and the translation of their preferences and intentions to ensuing behavior(s), was the onset of restrictive legislation in Britain, France, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States. Changes in the behavior of circulators and emigrants, when faced with an impending restriction of entry, would be forced on those involved. Circulators, faced with restricted entry, would have to reassess their intentions and perhaps choose a unilinear emigration or a return option. Those with emigration intentions would have to speed up their plans to move themselves and their dependents to a metropolitan destination.

Additionally, immigration restrictions enacted by Caribbean countries continued to modify interregional circulation, emigration intentions,

and behaviors. Such legislative barriers were, however, subjected to avoidance. Given the establishment of well-trodden paths, enclave welcoming communities and loopholes in the restrictive legislation in potential destinations, Caribbean people were able to overcome immigration barriers. Not surprisingly, there is a widely-held sentiment in the Caribbean that entry into Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Bahamas, Barbados, or Trinidad ("traditional" preferred destinations for many) is a legitimate exercise of initiative (Conway, 1986). Accordingly, illegal entry was viewed as a purposive enactment of circulation and/or emigration: the sort of risk-taking youth favor because of its adventurous nature. Illegal entry into extra-regional domains—such as Canada, the United States, and Britain—might be perceived differently, in part because they are "the other man's country" and in part because these metropolitan destinations can be accessed using legitimate means of entry: visiting and "overstaying" scarcely being considered a heinous offence. The crucial deciding factors would be the resources required to continue circulation, the location of resource-bundles, the short-term and long-term experiences of circulation "success," or the perceived returns of emigration, given the changing circumstances.

In terms of altering one's mobility strategy, the option is always available; that changing circumstances of entry, re-entry, and of opportunities at home or at the temporary destination will cause a re-evaluation of mobility strategies. Neither reciprocity nor unilinear displacement needs to be considered as irreversible, life-time mobility options. Additionally, the varying conditions of existence Caribbean people face both abroad and at home—together with their familial and social obligations to kin, friends, and acquaintances—evolve overtime and they also influence changes in strategy. The widening diaspora of Caribbean people, with networks embracing Europe, the Caribbean, North America (Canada and the United States, especially) and reaching into Australia, New Zealand and Africa, provides important social support systems and interactive information systems which condition and influence people's life-path decisions. Estimates of the Caribbean diaspora in North America are likely to be undercounts; but on average 12 percent live outside the region, and for some exceptional Caribbean societies—Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, and Puerto Rico—the number living abroad approximates, or exceeds, 20 percent (Table 1).

While migration is crucial to the livelihood of Caribbean peoples, it is also a survival option, a satisfying strategy, a socializing force, and a most flexible response in a globalizing world that favors such flexibility over other reactionary and resistant gestures. The enclave communities,

Table 1: Population Migration from the Caribbean to North America around 1991

Country of Origin	Census Count	Immigrants to the United States	Immigrants to Canada	Percentage Living Outside the Region
Antigua	64,000	<50	<50	3.01
Bahamas	255,000	21,600	1,100	8.19
Barbados	257,000	43,000	14,800	18.43
Belize	187,000	30,000	1,000	14.19
Cuba	10,627,700	737,000	1,800	6.58
Dominican Republic	7,110,300	347,900	2,800	4.92
Grenada	91,000	17,700	4,700	20.09

Table 1 (continued): Population Migration from the Caribbean to North America around 1991

Country of Origin	Census Count	Immigrants to the United States	Immigrants to Canada	Percentage Living Outside the Region
Guyana	795,000	120,700	66,100	19.38
Haiti	6,486,000	225,400	39,900	3.95
Jamaica	2,366,000	334,100	102,400	15.58
Puerto Rico	3,783,000	1,200,000	200	24.10
St. Lucia	133,000	<50	1,800	1.37
Trinidad & Tobago	1,236,000	115,700	49,400	12.00
Total	33,391,000	3,193,100	286,000	x = 11.67

Source: PAHO (1999) *Health in the Americas, 1998 Edition, Volume One*, Table A4, p. 80.

the family networks that link Caribbean people in transnational and multinational interactions, the wider Caribbean communities, retain national and regional identities and they also reinforce them. The circulation patterns of participants contribute to the overseas communities' perpetuation and resilience, as much as they draw upon them for social, familial, and economic support—even political support. The consequences of migration have been substantial, with positive and negative impact occurring as the processes have unfolded. There have been "brain-drains," with emigration resulting in severe losses of human capital, as Haitian scholarship demonstrates (Fass, 1990; Laguerre, 1984). The impact of migration on family cohesion has been noted with anxiety (Mohammed, 1998). There have been substantial depopulations (Lowenthal and Comitas, 1962), growing demographic imbalances such as ageing (Crane, 1971), and some of the very small island societies have been typecast as "remittance-dependent" (Conway, 1985). Recently, intra-Caribbean migration has received attention as an uncontrolled impact and relatively large scale immigration (legal and illegal) into such small islands as the British and U.S. Virgin Islands, Saint Maarten, and the Bahamas appears to be having severe impact on these microstates' physical and social infrastructures. This pattern of immigration has also brought ethnic and cultural diversity challenges and heightened concern among the islands' political regimes (UNECLAC, 1998a).

Remittances have been perceived as being both central to, and an element of distortion in, the island economies because of their considerable significance. Island microstates have been conceived of as weak, vulnerable, powerless, and dependent. Hence, the conceptualization of such economies as MIRAB economies, where Migration, Remittances, Aid, and the resultant largely urban Bureaucracy are central to the socio-economic system (Bertram and Watters, 1985; Bertram, 1986; Connell, 1988). Charges have also been leveled that remittances are fueling "conspicuous consumption," with investments manifesting themselves in consumerism of imported goods, notably imported foodstuffs, in elaborate housing construction, and in choices of expenditures in "marginally-productive" non-agricultural enterprises, such as shops and taxis (McKee and Tisdell, 1988; Lowenthal and Clarke, 1982; Richardson, 1975). The investment of remittances in fixed capital stock and the upgrading of housing is noted, but invariably they are characterized as unproductive or consumptive (Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991).

Remittances, indeed partly because they are usually substantial (Marshall, 1985), are detrimental to the long-term prospects for Caribbean societies' economic improvement since they do not transform or rejuvenate the rural economic sectors. Rather, they perpetuate historical-structural limitations (Rubenstein, 1983). Even when it is acknowledged that remittances are spent on such basic needs as housing, clothing and food, disclaimers that follow insist that they should be invested in "productive pursuits" (Otterbein, 1966; Rubenstein 1982, 1983). Else-

where, I have presented counter-arguments to this overly negative perspective (Conway, 1985, 1993b), and later in this article I will argue that remittances and return migrants, as well as migration and circulation, are likely to play extremely significant roles in the future of the Caribbean region because they form substantial migration-development relationships. They have been instrumental in fashioning Caribbean people's identities and social obligations (Chamberlain, 1995; Sutton and Makiesky, 1975), and they are fully incorporated into the region's social fabric.

Migration has been a fundamental force in the societal transformation of Caribbean microstates, it continues to be a livelihood tradition and ubiquitous option, and it will remain a significant social process of adaptation and adjustment in the future. The consequences of migration have been significant; but they remain significant, perhaps more than ever before, in the global economy where the consequences of migration are integral to future success, survival, and progress. Looking towards the consequences of migration is the focus of the next section.

3. The Place of Migration in Future Global-to-Local Relations in the Caribbean

Despite the vulnerabilities small islands face in today's "unfeeling" macro-world (Conway, 1998b; Sanders, 1997; Thomas, 1998), I would like to present a set of optimistic themes which identifies the relationships between migration and development, as well as promote a model that may move us towards a development project more capable of contributing to the sustainable development of Caribbean small island nation-states than the current harsh neoliberal medicines (Klak, 1998). I wish to promote a set of dimensions which has the potential for a progressive transformation of peoples' life-courses and life-politics: a vision of a sustainable future for Caribbean people where migration is cast in a positive light, not solely as a negative factor. Additionally, I advance the argument that the future of Caribbean microstates will, in part, depend upon migration and its progressive consequences—these are fundamental mechanisms for the sustenance of island societies, their future well-being, and survival. In part it will also require societal and national options of the kind Thomas (1998) has suggested—an internally driven counter-momentum to globalization and economic liberalism, the imperative to pursue regional economic and political integration—in addition to the promotion of transnational networks and the fostering of international partnerships as part of a region-wide program of sensitization, advocacy, mobilization, and the representation of Caribbean ideas, ideals, and socially progressive programs.

These "development dimensions" are as follows:

(1) (Re)establish national, or territorial, goals to reduce social inequities and move towards the elimination of abject poverty by supporting the rights of all people to the fundamental basic needs of food, shelter, health,

education, and welfare through the planned and effective implementation of the right to gainful employment in productive and self-realizing work settings.
(2) Build upon the human resource strengths of the region's small island societies, especially re-defining gender divisions and relations: empowering women, endowing educated youth with responsibilities, respecting the stores of local knowledge of the elderly, and building community solidarity and stake-holder involvements. There is also the need to foster the growth of social capital as well as human capital.
(3) There is a need for progressive use and empowerment of existing local (and regional) communal agencies and institutional bases.
(4) Increase institutional efforts directed at consolidating and encouraging people's initiatives, whether in formal or informal sector activities, and investment in the rich traditions of island and regional social, cultural capital stocks and heritages.
5) Better understanding and utilization of the migration diaspora—beyond maximizing uses of remittances and incorporating return migrants—to encourage the involvement of the overseas enclave communities in local development and environmental management. Involve overseas enclave communities and families in the sort of initiatives needed in (6) and (7) for island private sector transformation.
(6) A region-wide need for innovation and aggressive transformation in the private sectors of micro-states to meet current challenges in more diversified economies which can compete for "niches" in the globalizing markets of the Caribbean region and the American hemisphere. Involve migrant diaspora, both within the region and beyond.
(7) There is a need to seek progressive solutions for local development and economic diversification in the complementary and informal sector as well as the formal sectors of the urban and rural economies, especially the development and management of appropriate, low-density tourism styles that are needed to maintain and sustain the islands' complex environmental bases.
(8) There is a need for environmental monitoring, assessment, and informed policies that both mesh with economic plans for industrial and agricultural diversification, as well as meet the plurality of local needs and draw upon local and regional co-management and stake-holder self-management initiatives. Returnees and circulators are vital agents in this emerging political ecology arena, providing new skills and energies for "green activism."

Within many of these development dimensions, migration figures prominently in the progressive solution. Migration and circulation, migration networks, overseas enclave communities, remittances, return migrants, and even "transnational communities" are all aspects of human mobility which have important implications for future development scenarios. Some might have the potential to make positive contributions and

others may make indirect contributions while some migration and circulation processes may be counter-productive at best, and negative and harmful in their effects. Realistically, I cannot claim that all Caribbean small island development dimensions will hinge upon migration relations. The resident population, the islands' decision-makers, the public and private sectors, the regional and international development agencies, not to mention the external global financial and capitalist forces, are equally responsible and influential. Indeed, some would consider the Caribbean region to be helplessly vulnerable to global forces (Briguglio, 1995). Their small economies and nation-states are tremendously disadvantaged and powerless to survive the major "global technological shift" that is currently underway (Watson, 1995). I am less pessimistic, however, and I propose the following set of progressive dimensions in which migration-development relations are likely to be among the most crucial components.

3. 1. Reassert Basic Human Rights as the Goal of Appropriate, Sustainable Development

Lest we get caught trying to design, and defend, a model of small island development strictly within the context of the contemporary neoliberal regime of "market-triumphalism" and "privatization" hysteria, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the plight of the poor and the powerless and of the daily deprivations that too many suffer in the Caribbean (Lewis, 1993; Thomas, 1988). These legacies are in large part a consequence of the structural impositions accompanying the region's incorporation as a peripheral capitalist system: its structural unemployment, underdevelopment of human resources, its distorted and limited externally-dependent economies, and post-colonial social straight-jackets, to name a few. They are also, in part, a result of disappointing and destructive actions on the part of the internal colonialists, the merchant elites, and the autocratic regimes—the self-serving opportunists in the Caribbean who have allowed internal disorder to go unchallenged, misapplied development strategies, countenanced corruption, acquiesced to the powers of the market place, given way to the external forces, or given in completely. Regardless of the causal matrix, however, the contemporary iniquitous situation cannot be ignored, nor can it be tolerated. Social inequities have grown, and they continue to grow. Lengthy spells of deprivation do not foster family and community health, nor do high levels of structural unemployment help civil society reproduce itself or survive. Access to basic needs for all people, regardless of their family legacies and backgrounds, their gender, age, race and class positions must be the starting point for an appropriate development model that is sustainable. The right to a job, a place of work where the Caribbean people enjoy a process of self-realization and of unalienation, is at the basis of this human rights nexus [as Thomas (1993) perceptively argues].

3. 2. Human Resources and Self-Empowerment

If the societies of the Caribbean region are to muster their collective wills to address the problems they face, then women as well as men must be given the responsibility and afforded the chance(s) to fully participate in the endeavor. Some might argue that women's participation is the essential ingredient that has been missing in the project to date (Ford-Smith, 1986). We are clearly past the day when we have to debate the importance of women's roles in the development project facing the Caribbean people (Ellis, 1986; Mohammed and Shepherd, 1988). We should also not embrace simplistic notions that women's domestic roles prohibit their participation in labor markets or that within Caribbean family contexts matrifocality, extra-residential unions, and alternative patterns of parental responsibilities are anything but flexible family forms that are appropriate and viable in the prevailing societal conditions (Barrow, 1996). Women participate, women contribute, and women undertake progressive communal activities—notwithstanding the fact that they are vulnerable groups among the "poorest of the poor," according to Massiah (1989). Women also migrate, and they should not become so vulnerable and devoid of societal support that it is their desperate situation, or life threatening situation, that uproots them from their Caribbean home and community. The region's history records this common situation all too commonly. But today, women should not be facing the iniquitous conditions of the past such that they are "forced" to migrate as a last resort, and certainly they should not have to face such desperate conditions of existence in the future.

However, the argument should not stop when women's rights have progressed to levels of parity with men: equal access in the workplace, equal pay, equal opportunities in education, professions and professional advancements, equal access to finance capital, institutional support-systems, and equal power-relations. Progressive gender-relations which empower women will empower men, though traditional "masculinists" may wish to dispute it. On the other hand, policies reversing the marginalization of women, especially poor women in the Caribbean, should not be undertaken at the expense of male marginalization. Gender-substitution is scarcely the answer. As stressed above, basic rights to the fundamental necessities of existence and livelihood should be available to all, regardless of gender, age, race and class.

The youth of the region are also an untapped resource, or at least an underdeveloped resource. While the European-style education systems have been criticized for their limited curricula and for their regional inappropriateness, nevertheless, youth in the Caribbean gain literacy, gain rudimentary mathematics prowess, and the majority acquire basic skills in reading, writing, and arithmetic. It is worth noting that these islands post some of the most impressive literacy rates in the developing world, many higher than the United States. However, high rates of unemployment among young men in particular reflect a dysfunctional match

between educational goals and the performance of the economic sectors, a mismatch that is leading to increased social tensions, increases in youth crime rates, and increased alienation. Of course, migration "off the island" also results from young peoples' frustration with the lack of job opportunities at home. Indeed, such migration is viewed almost as a necessary "right-of-passage" for young men in many of the smallest island societies: Nevis, Saba, and the Grenadines come to mind as examples. Much of this is intra-regional migration, with youth traveling well-worn paths to welcoming communities in other Caribbean venues: Nevis to Antigua, or the U.S. Virgin Islands, Grenada and the Grenadines to Trinidad, Saba to Puerto Rico, Barbados and farther-flung hosts for seafaring men. Retaining ties with their home, and welcoming returning native sons, is also a common practice; so the human capital realized by migration and circulation of the young can be positively invested later in life. Perhaps it is most practical to consider the youthful resource bases of small islands as flexible labor, not as a fixed resource pool. Investment in youth development should not be stinted solely because many might take their skills and energy elsewhere for a time—the "brain-drain" danger that some commentators bemoan (McKee and Tisdell, 1988; UNITAR, 1971).

3. 3. Maintaining Local Autonomy, Developing Regional Capacities

Caribbean societies have long held traditions of community self-help; and traditions of rotating credit associations have been carried forward to the current period, both in the Caribbean and among overseas enclave communities. These informal cooperative savings institutions have contributed to the economic improvements in many a West Indian, African, and Afro-American communities. *Susus* are Trinidad's variant, *sans* are widespread in the Dominican Republic, *esus* are in the Bahamas, *boxes* in Guyana, Barbados, Antigua and other islands, and *partners* are the variant in Jamaica (Bonnett, 1980). Women are often the main participants in these savings groups, but married women act on behalf of their spouses. Among ethnic minorities, such as the Chinese, men participate fully in such schemes. There are other communal cooperative activities practiced among rural communities, where community self-help in the erecting of buildings and in the tending and harvesting of crops stem from earlier times. Remoteness and the lack of provision of facilities by the central authorities in the capital cities meant that many rural communities had to fend for themselves (Riviere, 1990). Despite the small geographical distances involved in many cases, such relative remoteness necessitated community self-reliance; and this has not been dispelled even with the high degrees of urbanization and suburbanization most Caribbean islands have experienced. Urban alienation has, of course, occurred. There are urban lifestyles inimical to the fostering of such communal solidarities: in-

dividualism, greed, violence and double-dealing, criminal and anti-social behavior are present in Caribbean cities as they are in North American cities. However, Caribbean urban neighborhoods have their specific community cultures (Conway and Brown, 1980), quite often rural-urban interaction networks are strongly forged and are sustaining linkages providing urban communities with identities, resources, and cultural capital (Potter, 1989). There is, therefore, an available reservoir of community solidarity and of community consciousness in both urban and rural areas on which to build local initiatives and small development projects and to incorporate them into progressive institutional frameworks.

There is also welcome evidence of pan-Caribbean regional cooperation. There are formal institutions, such as the newly formed Association of Caribbean States (ACS). The Caribbean Community CARICOM, the British Caribbean's cooperative political institution on trade relations, still continues, despite its less than stellar history of achievements (de Alonso, 1992). Bilateral agreements also strongly influence hemispheric relations, such as the Canada-Caribbean trade (CARIBCAN) and the much-maligned United States-Central American and Caribbean agreement, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), that President Reagan launched. Multinational lending institutions also direct their attentions towards the region's development problems, notably the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank (Hardy, 1995). Of the two, the latter appears more amenable to helping local and regional initiatives, given its multilateral funding base and willingness to chart a course more independent of United States' administrative directives than the IADB (Bakan, Cox and Leys, 1993).

Notwithstanding the potential for such pan-Caribbean financial institutions to cooperate and contribute to future development projects in the Caribbean, the tendency of their decision-makers to rely on neoclassical economics to assess cost-benefit ratios of potential projects they might support means that they miss important considerations. Environmental consequences, social impact, and longer-term consequences might be underestimated, or omitted, because they are unmeasurable, or they lack quantified surrogates. Political pressure from outside the formal structures of negotiation over economic development matters must become viable and active. There must be growth in their constituencies and increased political strength of local and regional non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which have local development and environmental preservation and conservation in their objectives (Gamman, 1994). NGOs such as the Caribbean Conservation Association (CCA) and the Island Resources Foundation (IRF) have already proven their worth. In St. Lucia, the co-management initiatives of CANARI have demonstrated their worth locally and to a wider audience. There are other coalitions underway, and the continued activism of such NGOs is garnering respect and admiration. It is also making its influence felt in national government circles, and there is a

growing network of pan-regional cooperation that can only help future projects.

The involvement of more and more Caribbean people in a whole range of casual and temporary small-scale economic activities classified as "informal" or "underground" might be dismissed as ephemeral, as merely survival or subsistence, or as "disguised-unemployment" because they appear to lack the long-term continuities of formal employment. Such a prejudiced view of this complementary "real-life economic" sector (Wheelock, 1992) belies its central role in the day-to-day struggle of the Caribbean poor, and not-so-poor, to make ends meet, put food on the table, acquire some modest savings, provide for children's schooling needs, among other household basic needs (Roberts, 1994). Local-level and community-level activities have long traditions—often built on church affiliations, community self-reliance, and village community endeavors (Gomes, 1985; Riviere, 1981). The "higglers" of rural Jamaica and the "hucksters" of Dominica have been highlighted as successful female entrepreneurs in the trading business (Ellis, 1986; Homiak, 1986). Additionally, the realization that Trinidadian (and Commonwealth Caribbean) poor maintain deeply-entrenched traditions and practices of rural-urban interactions in informal transfers of goods, people (labor), services, favors, reciprocal activities, obligations, financial, and communal support (Lloyd-Evans and Potter, 1991; Potter, 1993) suggests that such important self-help networks are in place and that they may be effectively operating elsewhere in the region.

On the other hand, people's reliance on "informal sector" activities should not be heralded carte blanche as a salvation. Some underground economic activities are criminal, by intent and purpose, some embroil participants in dubious and illegal ventures, and some snare relatively innocent (if desperate) people in their vices—prostitution, gambling, and criminal rings (Richardson, 1992). Currently, the extent of the penetration of international drug-running cartels in many Caribbean countries' underground economies is a very real threat as well as a serious problem, which serves as a somber counter argument to any more positive characterization of such "internationalized" systems of informal enterprises (Griffith and Munroe, 1995; Maingot, 1994). That drug-smuggling is also embedded in the neoliberal "marketplace of opportunities" that is the North American hemisphere's commercial domain has not escaped notice (Coram, 1993).

In Guyana, the (informal) parallel economy grew to prominence while the Cooperative Socialist regime of Forbes Burnham was oh-so-destructively running down the formal economy of that promising South American enclave. Overseas migration was part of this survival strategy, with families almost forced by necessity to have one of their members "making money" in the United States or Canada, to provide the essential underground currency—dollars. While involvement in this parallel economy became a necessary strategy for survival among many of the poor,

and not-so-poor, in that troubled country, it also spawned dubious practices. Gold and diamond smuggling across the Guyana-Brazil and Guyana-Venezuela borders is now a major illegal commercial enterprise, and the political and economic affairs of the interior of Guyana is scarcely accountable to the Georgetown regime or to international law enforcement agencies. This is a troubling development in Guyana as it attempts to rebuild its shattered economy, regains its previous vitality, and always-promising high levels of productivity in rice and sugar production, in bauxite mining, mineral exports, and timber exportation. This latter formal sector initiative by Guyana's government has recently come under attack, however, with criticisms leveled that the exploitation of Guyana's interior forests is being handed over to rapacious South East Asian corporations, several with highly questionable records of honesty and integrity (Colchester, 1997). Again, this appears to be another example of the destructive and abusive power of international cartels and corporate agents operating in the interstices of the global economy: appearing formal, while behaving informally and questionably, if not illegally. Such practices are to be resisted, not condoned or reluctantly allowed in the name of "development" and economic growth. If we are to characterize informal sector activities in terms of their potential to foster positive returns for Caribbean people involved, then it may be worth stressing that it would be at the local level and at the community level that such activities contribute to the livelihood of Caribbean people.

3. 4. Build upon Social and Cultural Heritages

The cultural landscapes of the Caribbean, a region of exceptional cultural diversity, differing European, Afro-Caribbean, Asian and creole societies, unique folk, patois languages and folklores, are veritable showcases of islands rich in heritages and cultural identities. These very qualities are often undervalued, however, when it comes to discussions about island development and Caribbean futures (Hodge, 1986). Rather, small society limitations, their openness to alien cultural influences, easy penetration by international (U.S.) cultural messages, and their mimicry of European or Western models is bemoaned. Indeed, the very nature of their diverse inter-mixed, cultural heritages, the difficulties facing their typecasting in comparison to "traditional" continental norms (not truly European, nor African, nor Asian, nor North American, are they?), and their changing forms and scope, lend themselves to criticism, or dismissal, of Caribbean cultures as significant, vibrant, and resilient. Caribbeanists know better, of course (Lewis, 1983; Mintz and Price, 1983).

Far from being minor hearths for cultural innovations, rich cultural traditions in literature, music, religion, folklore, and cuisine vibrate through the region and beyond. The region claims many world famous literary figures, several with radical and revolutionary messages that have championed the causes of minorities, the colonized, and the oppressed.

There are Nobel Prize winners in Economics and Literature, Sir Arthur Lewis and Derek Walcott, respectively. World-wide musical movements have their hearth in the Caribbean, Jamaican reggae and Puerto Rican salsa, for example (Bibly, 1985; Davis and Simon, 1983; Duany, 1984). From Trinidad has come steel-band orchestras, Calypso and Carnival (Warner, 1983), and the emergence of other road-march and steel band festivals in London, Brooklyn, New York, and Toronto—all, immigrant-inspired—are testimony to the creative power of these cultural happenings. Barbados' ingenuity and creative enterprise has renovated its "Crop-Over" Festival and fostered renewals of other communal practices and celebrations born out of the heritages of its plantation past and the peoples' struggles. Not unrelated, some Caribbean governments' promotion of "Heritage tourism" has been couched in terms of its culturally-sensitive style, among alternatives for mass-tourism, and cruise-ship invasions. However, as Nettleford (1993) warns, heritage tourism must not debase itself, it must not cheapen the message to cater to alien foreign tastes, nor must it merely become just another spectacle for the visitor's consumption.

Cultural exchanges between the Caribbean, North America, Europe, and Africa have led to the diffusion of ideas, musical styles, dance rhythms, festivals, modes of dress, party-styles, religious practices, and even cuisine practices. The interchanges have been considerable, and they have contributed to the variety and vitality of cultural practices in all societies involved. There is an economic side to this exchange, too. For Caribbean people involved in these exchanges, such as music and dance performances, festival-playing, poetry-reading, fashion-modeling, opportunities to go abroad to perform, or to host international audiences in the Caribbean have widened their horizons and made gainful careers possible (Leymarie, 1994).

Now, if I may add one more regional cultural practice to this list, which has had, and is having, an equally important influence on the career choices of Caribbean youth, it is sports. Dominican baseball players are now recruited heavily by U.S. major league teams. British West Indian cricketers have been recruited by Lancashire League and English county cricket teams since the 1950s, and they now find opportunities in Australia as well (Beckles and Stoddart, 1995). Promising athletes from Jamaica, Cuba, Trinidad, to name three popular sources, are recruited by American universities to make their National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) teams competitive, and many of these prospective professional athletes take advantage of this institution's facilities to train and improve their talents. It is very common these days for many of the top U.S.-based athletes from the Caribbean region to represent their countries in international events, such as the Pan American Games and the Olympics.

Not all athletes leave, however, and the strong traditions of sports in Caribbean societies are evidenced in the sportsmen and women who participate in team events, and join sports clubs and local associations, from school days onward. Island rivalries are never more intense than the

Shell Shield clashes between Barbados and the Leeward Islands, between Guyana and Trinidad, or football (soccer) matches between Jamaica and Trinidad. On the other hand, Jamaica's recent success that had its soccer team competing among the final sixteen in the 1998 World Cup was loudly applauded throughout the Caribbean. Such "Caribbean" achievements in international events evoke a strong sense of regional pride and widespread support, and they are positive signs that a broader reservoir of social capital can be accumulated and built upon. Sports play an integral role in the social dynamics of Caribbean islands since it seems to constantly reflect the following: old divisions, new realities, changing standards, waxing and waning fortunes, individual and collective efforts, and exudes the passions of those involved, whether as players, teachers and coaches, supporters, and sponsors—even bystanders and disinterested relatives are caught up in the milieu. Self-pride, self-reliance, as well as team spirit are cultivated through the involvement with sports in the community; and though Caribbean people are not unique in their passion, nevertheless, athletic individual and team sports of many kinds are part of the cultural rubric from which we can anticipate positive returns.

3. 5. Better Understanding and Utilization of Diaspora Networks

Long-held traditions of international mobility, emigration, and circulation are highly inter-related with the region's development and underdevelopment experiences. They are at the bases of today's well-developed diaspora, with enclave populations in multilocal networks spread between locales within the Caribbean region, the hemisphere (North America) and trans-Atlantic (in Europe). Family networks, wider kin networks, ethnic networks, and inter-network transfers all facilitate the movement of people, goods, information, technology, and capital. The Caribbean residents are linked to overseas relatives, friends, business acquaintances, and a wealth of opportunities far wider than the geographically constrained fields of the island home. The networks are multilocal, with overseas kin and friends elsewhere in the Caribbean, and in geographically distant metropolitan areas in Europe and North America (Conway, 1994). They are global in extent, and the increasing complexity of the movements within these networks and the variations in the consequences for those involved are probably underestimated.

There is a pressing need for Caribbean policy makers to better understand the complexity of the migration currents their countries are fostering if the utility of these currents is to be recognized and incorporated into policies. For too long, simplistic notions of migration-induced problems like the "brain-drain" and the uncritical acceptance that emigration is a "safety valve" for population pressure, or to relieve unemployment pressures, have held sway. Caribbean policy-makers in the development and population areas need to rethink their ideas on how best to respond to the current state of migration-development relations in their

territories and their overseas transnational networks. The potential for better use of these already existing circuits is obvious, and it is progressive. Overseas Caribbean enclave populations constitute political, social, cultural, and economic forces that are presently undervalued and underutilized. Remittances constitute a flow of capital and goods in kind that have progressive impacts on recipients' likelihoods (Bascom, 1990; Conway, 1993b).

Remittances contribute to family sustenance and basic needs, the support of health, welfare and education of children, the improvement of the material well-being of the aged, and of spouses and disadvantaged kin remaining behind. Remittances have helped family business entrepreneurialism, they finance migration of siblings, and they are spent, saved, and invested according to the needs of the household recipients and the donor's obligations. Remittance investments in land, property, and housing may influence local market dynamics; but it would be premature to generalize about the effects of remittances on price inflation in these sectors, given the dearth of analyses. It can be proposed, however, that remittances have positive non-monetary and social effects that outweigh the negative aspects, especially when people's relations and interactions are examined at the micro-scale: the household level (see Conway and Cohen, 1998; Connell and Conway, 2000 for comparisons with other transnational communities in Mexico and the South Pacific).

Return migrants are a pool of undervalued resources too easily dismissed as ineffective "agents of change." Retiring returnees are merely one category of return migrants; returning students are another (De Souza, 1998). A recent study of return migration to the islands of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States—Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the British Virgin Islands—noted that returnees are quite heterogeneous, that they vary considerably in occupational attainment, and that their sojourns away from their home island also vary in duration. The study implied that returnees are a significant group in many island populations, but the study was unable to address some of the issues relating to their contribution because of data shortcomings (UNECLAC, 1998b). It is safe to generalize, however, that return migrants can replenish local social capital stocks, and that they can be positive contributors to their home communities (Gmelch, 1987, 1992). They can also bring innovation and activism to the local political arena (Berman-Santana, 1996; Conway and Lorah, 1995). Return migrants may compete in the local business community, be successful, stimulate competition, and expand local economic niches (Chevannes and Ricketts, 1997). Expecting returnees to revitalize small-scale farming or to diversify small island rural economies might be beyond their capacities, given the structural and institutional limitations Caribbean small-scale farming faces in the current climate of neoliberalism. Contributions to small business expansion in producer services, tourism, retailing, transportation, and the commercial services sector are more likely or have greater potential.

The future of every Caribbean society is inextricably tied to the wider society which would include the overseas, enclave sojourners, emigrant-relatives, and expatriates as essential functionaries, not lost emigres. The diaspora need not be counter-productive. It can certainly be better utilized and incorporated into the development plans of Caribbean microstates. The wide networks that link the Caribbean communities and families across multinational space can themselves provide valuable information; they can contribute to the stocks of human and social capital, and they can function as effective conduits for the interchange of the whole bundle of factors of production—capital, labor, goods, information, technology and innovations. The diaspora contributes significantly to the transnational transfer of social and cultural innovations, the wider encouragement and sharing of Caribbean music, dance, poetry, literature traditions, and the cementing of multinational linkages that connect European, North American, and Caribbean networks. They have transnational economic functions, too.

3. 6. Exploit Economic Niches

Economic planning in microstates is still a question of "management" and "best use," as Best (1966) argued over a generation ago. The global forces that are rampant in international commerce, finance, and production do not make the job easier, far from it! Watson's (1995) warning of the major structural changes at large, the forces of neoliberalism, and of the techno-paradigm shift which place Caribbean small states in a critical position must be heeded. Business as usual will no longer suffice (Gayle, 1995). Past experiences have demonstrated that alternative models of development cannot be fashioned unless there are fundamental realignments in the investment strategies of domestic capital, merchant capital and unless there are realistic, progressive strategies sought (Lewis, 1993). Reliance upon agricultural commodity exports was always known to be dangerous; yet progress at agricultural diversification has been elusive. The promotion of non- traditional agricultural exports has not yet had significant effects, although there is some promise for domestic agriculture, if transportation limitations could be overcome (Wiley, 1998).

The local and regional tourism markets appear to be one economic niche where Caribbean producers should focus their efforts rather than the global markets. There are considerable multipliers to be gained from improving the linkages between agriculture, commerce, and tourism (Momsen, 1998). Despite the long-held (but largely unsubstantiated) "myth" that the tourism industry will invariably rely on imported foodstuffs, more recent studies have observed that tourism also stimulates demand for local produce in the tourist havens. In addition, tourism and the souvenir foodstuff agro-industries of the Caribbean appear to have prospered from the emergence of export opportunities for the overseas marketing of local food delicacies, such as rum, pepper sauce, and tropical

fruit juices (Momsen, 1998). The demand for favorite national dishes among enclave communities in Europe and North America is also stimulating local agro-industries and local agricultural production, as the successful case of ackee marketing among overseas Jamaicans demonstrates (Gordon, Anderson and Robotham, 1997).

In terms of industrial diversification, there is some evidence that the following economic niches can be accessed by Caribbean firms: producer services, "flexible" production systems in kit-assembly and product-assembly; and communications and information services (Blackman, 1991; Girvan and Marcelle, 1990; Goss and Knudsen, 1994; Henry, 1990). Regional markets are currently larger and have an increasing capacity to absorb Caribbean produce, if it is competitively priced and effectively marketed. While international commodity penetration is intense, and ubiquitous, discretionary Caribbean tastes will include local produce and local goods in their selections. Caribbean customers are as particular as others; and local products of high quality are competitive to mass-produced imported goods, especially if they are not "special" or "quality" goods. Again, Caribbean preferences for local quality rum brands appear to bear this out. Increased diversity in economic enterprises must be sought, however, and the activities of entrepreneurs operating within "transnational corporations of kin," building island and mainland business associations and operations, need to be encouraged (Connell, 1993). Portes and Guarnizo (1991) labeled their Dominican transnational businessmen as innovative "tropical capitalists." Migration and circulation are fundamental mechanisms in these ventures, and although a few studies have appeared on the role remittances play in the capitalization of new business ventures (Conway, 1993b; Chevannes and Ricketts, 1997), little can be generalized on the impact of remittances in furthering private entrepreneurialism. Pacific island research, on the other hand, indicates that remittances are highly significant for family business operations (Connell and Conway, 1999).

3. 7. Plan Appropriate Tourism Styles

Where does tourism fit in this model? The governments in the Caribbean, one by one, sooner or later, have come to rely on this complex, multifaceted "global" industry. The growth of this twentieth century industrial ensemble as a world-wide phenomenon has been nothing short of spectacular, outstripping many other more-conventional commercial sector expansions. Nevertheless, the industry provides plenty of evidence for its critics, who have been especially critical of the social costs incurred (Karch and Dann, 1981; McAfee, 1991: Pattullo, 1996). On the positive side, however, there is Poon's (1993) persuasive, and enthusiastic, propositions on how the Caribbean can plan for and benefit from "new tourism". Then, there are suggestions that "ecotourism" is an alternative tourism style worth implementing, and some small island governments such as

Dominica are already promoting this variant (Gayle, 1997). Briefly, let me critically appraise these offerings.

"New tourists" are certainly a welcome differentiation, with their higher multiplier effects and their "niche markets" providing wider opportunities and incentives for a differentiated and more culturally-rich Caribbean tourism product (see Conway, 1993). Weaver's (1991, 1993) advocacy of "alternative ecotourism" strategies for some venues also appear appropriate. I should add that other low-density variants are equally socially-conformable and appropriate: such as sport tourism, nature tourism, heritage and culture tourism, even retirement tourism. However, whether the emergence of "new tourism" heralds the industry's transformation to a flexible, restructured ensemble replacing "mass tourism," as "flexibilism" has been thought to restructure Fordism/Taylorism manufacturing systems, is still in considerable doubt (Ionnades, 1992, 1995). Caribbean venues such as St. Croix, Puerto Rico, and Barbados already in Stage III, of what McElroy and de Albuquerque (1991) consider as "High-Density Tourism Styles," are already so dependent on mass tourism that they may not have the flexibility to diversify in appropriate and environmentally-sustainable ways. The major external airlines that dominate the travel scene have the delivery of a significant number of tourists at the heart of their interests in serving the Caribbean. The cruise-line invasion of the Caribbean is scarcely a contemporary new trend of tourism with the dimensions of flexibilism that those of us who advocate the maintenance of low-density styles for Caribbean places would like to see encouraged. Indeed, the threat posed by unplanned and managed cruise-line tourism appears considerable, and it may constitute an immediate or fast-looming crisis that should merit the progressive, even aggressive, intervention of the state, to ward off this assault, or at best neutralize its overwhelming effects.

Poon's (1993) unbridled enthusiasm for such benign direct effects under neoliberalism must be questioned. These forces are dominant globally; however, Caribbean people, and decision-makers in the public and private sectors alike, must retain a healthy skepticism regarding the effects of such global external forces. Most crucial in this respect must be the progressive and proactive involvement of Caribbean states in their "stewardship role," with the maintenance of each country's landscapes, coastal zones, marine habitats, as well as cultural heritages. There must be progressive co-management and local democratic economic-decision making, involving not only those within the tourist sector, broadly defined, but local communities, public-private coalitions of local authorities, NGOs, artisans, citizens, and even children (Conway and Lorah, 1995). Being "flexible," creative, and embracing visionary plans for island tourism should be at the forefront of the fifth wave—taking advantage of appropriate information and communication technologies, where Caribbean self-interests and territorial sovereignty are neither compromised nor subverted to international and transnational capital profiteering.

Furthermore, the unknown, underexplored, and most probably undervalued dimensions of an appropriate tourism industry might very well be the industry's capacities to incubate and spawn a wider set of multiplier effects than previously envisioned. These capacities must go beyond the essential linkages that tourism must build between local agriculture, local micro-businesses, local producer services, even local manufacturing-customizing of imported technologies, and of imported commodities (both product lines in need of customizing for tropical/Caribbean island uses). The wider set involves tourism's place in the transnational systems, in inter-regional associations, cooperative ventures (rather than competitive scenarios), and tourism's partnership with other sectoral expansions, especially communication services development and customizing. The state's role in aiding and facilitating co-management initiatives—where tourism planning, environmental conservation and marine resources management, and local, democratic economic decision-making are joint-undertakings which are treated as a merged bundle of policy-mandates and practices—is crucial for development over the long-term.

3. 8. Taking Environmental Sustainability Seriously

The long-term view for Caribbean development in general, and appropriate tourism is dependent upon environmentally conscious plans of action. The responsible "stewards," however, must be us, Caribbeanists, Caribbean democracies, and the Caribbean people. We can no more leave it to the international community, as we can to international business, commerce, and financial capital.

Although the last two decades have witnessed declines in standards of living and rapid increases in population in several countries, the nearly six percent per annum increase in economic growth needed to meet the people's basic needs should be possible without destroying the natural environment. However, there should be a new kind of growth regime. For example, the region should begin living off the interest on its stock of ecological capital instead of running down its stock of natural resources. It will require that national development policies and projects emanate from ecologically-sound analyses of the natural resource base, and that projects not meeting "sustainability" criteria are rejected, even those promising immediate foreign exchange earnings offered by international donors or promoted by international financial institutions. Most importantly, sustainable development goals can only be reached when development policies integrate economic and natural resources management planning (Cox and Embree, 1990). This new sustainable development regime must embrace a strategic imperative to involve people in the development process. In this regard, special attention must be given to involving women, youth, and the labor force in decisions affecting their lives, livelihoods, local environments, and living spaces. The constraining

effects of indebtedness, of continued impoverishment, the widening gap between the affluence (and consumption excesses) of the North are noted to be significant obstacles—all contributing to the unsustainability of the current patterns of Caribbean development, now under the yoke of neoliberalism.

Signs for a renewal of optimism also appear to be occurring in the new priorities emerging at the international level, where environmental conservation and preservation have been thrust to the forefront of global consciousness (Collinson, 1996; Cox and Embree, 1990). It has been further pushed into the spotlight by some United Nations efforts including the Rio Environmental Conference of 1992, its accompanying NGO Forum, and the 1994 Small Island Conference in Barbados. More recent follow-ups of that 1994 Conference and its Program of Action include the Annual Reports of the Commission on Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, and Reports on Plans and Projects implemented, under implementation, or envisaged for the period 1999-2003 by bilateral donors, United Nations organizations, and other international organizations. In the Caribbean region, recent examinations of the extent of environmental action, and of the growth and "success" of regional co-management efforts by NGOs such as CANARI and CCA, would suggest that some progress is at least underway (Conway and Lorah, 1995; Renard, 1992; Smith and Berkes, 1991, 1993; Smith, 1994). Despite the ongoing political and scientific debates over the extent of global warming, the lack of progress towards a real global consensus on the need for concerted global action to ban CFCs, to reduce auto-emissions, global-to-local considerations for environmental security and ecosystem protection can no longer be left out of development agendas. The environmental debate is with us, and it will continue to be a part of international discourse and negotiations (Gamman, 1994).

4. Conclusion: Migration-Development Relations are of Crucial Importance

Migration has been a fundamental force in the Caribbean region's past, it is a region-wide livelihood tradition, a necessary survival strategy for many, and it frames the identity of the Caribbean people. At the same time, it promises to be a fundamental progressive force for the future. Migration and circulation, return migration and remittances, multilocal networks of exchange of information, ideas, capital and people, social capital accumulation, and the regeneration of social and cultural capital stocks in Caribbean small island societies are important "developmental" factors in the contemporary globalizing world. The region's links with North America, Europe, even with Australia, are fostered anew by diaspora networks. The transnational character of many Caribbean people's lives may make identities more pluralistic, but they do not fundamentally undermine Car-

ibbean societal strengths. Caribbean people's livelihoods are inextricably linked to migration in such profound ways that some have characterized the situation quite negatively as a "culture of migration" (Mohammed, 1998). Indeed, separation of family members, spouses, and the abandonment of children and elderly dependents occurs with negative consequences for those involved. Undertaking migration is itself a risky strategy; and all do not succeed, achieve their objectives, return as successes, or even return at all (Conway, 1988). Despite the negatives, however, migration has its positive consequences: among them remittances, social and human capital stocks accumulation, transnational flexibilities, and wider networks of social and economic support. Intra-regional migration may indeed foster intra-regional cooperation and pan-Caribbean sentiments in more meaningful ways than institutional political negotiations. Extra-regional migration and circulation perpetuate hemispheric dependencies; but this is scarcely new, nor is it a debilitating tendency given today's ever-more interdependent, globalizing world.

This article has situated the case for a better future around the many migration-development relationships that characterize people's existence in the Caribbean and within the wider Caribbean diaspora. The people who call Caribbean microstates their home, see their nations facing an unfriendly (or unfeeling?) globalizing regime, they see their home economies in "crisis," and observe their homes' continued vulnerability to the macro-level powers swirling around them. There are positive signs, however, that the situation is not so bleak. There are opportunities for advancing a progressive agenda for small island developing states, and I have indicated a set of dimensions around which a future development model can be fashioned. Crucial to the outcome, however, will be an improved understanding, and appreciation, of how migration-development relations fit into this sustainable future. This article has advanced the cause, it remains for policy-makers and Caribbean decision-makers to have the political will and the political fortitude to chart such a progressive agenda, and turn aside, deflect or reject, the overbearing messages of neoliberalism.

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