

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

**Copyright © 2015 International Development Options
All Rights Reserved**

Volume Seven

Winter-Spring 2014-2015

Nos. 3-4.

EMERGING GLOBAL POWERS (BRICS): AN ASSESSMENT OF CHINA'S ROLE WITHIN THE GROUP AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

Edgar Bwalya
Department of Political and Administrative Studies
University of Botswana

ABSTRACT

This article endeavors to analyze the relations between the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the BRICS, an acronym that was coined by Jim O'Neill almost fifteen years ago when he was the head of economics at Goldman Sachs. The BRICS, which is dominated by China, the second largest economy in the world, claim that they want to contribute to the creation of a new, fair, peaceful, and prosperous international order that benefits all stakeholders through cooperation and zero-sum progress. They also contend that their engagement with Africa and the rest of the world is based on these principles. Some analysts and observers believe that after half a century of Western efforts to develop Africa, the BRICS, led by China, are providing a model that does not involve various preconditions. This model is viewed as a refreshing alternative for African states and other developing countries. Critics, especially scholars from the West, have devoted considerable attention to denouncing the BRICS as the "new colonizing powers" of Africa whose sole aim is to exploit the continent's natural resources and that this process is deepening the continent's dependence. It is against this backdrop that this article argues that the foregoing views are not only very simplistic and linear, but they do not capture an accurate picture of the complex and largely beneficial relationship between the BRICS and African states.

EMERGING GLOBAL POWERS (BRICS): AN ASSESSMENT OF CHINA'S ROLE WITHIN THE GROUP AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

Edgar Bwalya
University of Botswana

1. Introduction

Since its formation as a pressure group in 2006, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) have attracted a surge of countless articles and books written about them by academics, commentators and journalists from the West and developing nations alike. In general, many of the issues that are published regarding the BRICS have focused on the viability and alleged quick demise of the group and charges that these countries are merely exploiting Africans and their natural resources, especially minerals and oil (Pant, 2013; Taylor, 2014). The group was formed with the aim of promoting world economic growth, global governance, South-South cooperation, common development and global peace, and it has become an important player in Africa and in global affairs (Rothkopf, 2009; Escobar, 2014; Taylor, 2014; Bond, 2014). Based largely on conjecture, some critics claim that the BRICS will soon disintegrate as a group and this is usually heightened by either economic or political events that occur in one or more of the member states and at a global level (Sharma, 2012; Follath, 2013; Pant, 2013). A good example is the recent (2015) Chinese \$4 trillion stock market losses and the devaluation of the Yuan, which many now claim is responsible for the declines in other of stock markets around the world and the related economic uncertainty (CNN News, August 25, 2015; *The Economist*, August 15, 2015). Another example is in 2013 when India, South Africa and Brazil experienced large losses in currency values that reduced investment flows after the flight of capital (Bond, 2014a). What critics do not point out is the fact that the forgoing incidents are related to the cyclical flow of capitalism and will continue to occur in future.

The other popular argument is that far from trying to assist and collaborate with African countries, the BRICS are now the new imperialists engaged in a new scramble for Africa that is centered on oil and minerals through which billions of dollars' worth of natural resources are being siphoned from the continent. It is also argued that African economies are being deindustrialized and they are diversifying their external dependence (Wang and Rosenau, 2009; Taylor, 2014; Bond, 2014a; Leigh and Pallister, 2005; Southall and Melber, 2009). Some critics have already declared the group a "miracle" dead or the "fruit" picked and they claim that the recent positive developments in the BRICS' nations and Africa cannot be sustained (Mahajan, 2008; Sharma, 2012; Follath, 2013; Pant, 2013). However, so far the evidence shows that the predictions of the disintegration and quick demise of the BRICS are not going to happen anytime soon.

This article endeavors to assess the complex, multidimensional and hotly debated relations between Africa and the five emerging global powers – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – and how China appears to be playing a dominant role within the group that is undoubtedly contributing to the development of the continent. This is a fact that even the most critical analysts of the group acknowledge (Pant, 2013; Taylor, 2014; Bond, 2014; *Economist*, March 2, 2013 and Escobar, 2014). The main contention of this article is that international liberalism allows both state and non-state actors to play an important role in bilateral and multilateral relations including the promotion of cooperation for mutual benefits. The article is organized as follows: the first section briefly outlines the background of the BRICS and the second section provides a summary of their achievements. The third section discusses the benefits of Africa's engagement with the BRICS and the fourth section is a criticism of the BRICS as a group. The fifth section deals with reactions to the criticisms of the BRICS and the last section provides a conclusion.

2. Brief Background of the BRICS

The BRICS, which represents 43 percent of the world's population, is now a recognized pressure group or a global alliance of region-

al powers that is advocating dialogue and cooperation among countries by focusing on the promotion of peace, security and development in a multipolar, interdependent, and increasingly complex globalizing world (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2012; Shetty, 2011). Mr. Jim O'Neill, a former chief economist at Goldman Sachs, coined the term BRIC, which later became BRICS after South Africa joined the group in 2010. The acronym was used to describe a group of four emerging-market economies consisting of Brazil, China, India, and Russia (Engardio and Arndt, 2006). The term 'BRIC' was formalized in 2006 when the foreign ministers of the original four states began a series of high-level meetings (Younis et. el., 2013). The BRIC's first formal summit took place on June 8, 2008 in Yekaterinburg, Russia and was followed by a joint statement that called for reforms of the international financial system, the global trading system, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and cooperation in the field of energy to ensure global stability and sustainability (Faulconbridge, 2008; Swaran, 2013; Younis et. el., 2013).

Prior to the above meeting, members of the BRICS had met on the side-lines of the UN conferences and since 2008 they have been holding annual summits and have continued to call for reforms of global institutions in order to meet the needs of all member states (Singh, 2013; Younis et. el., 2013). In 2012, for instance, the BRICS nations called for the urgent implementation of the 2010 Governance and Quota Reform before the 2012 IMF – World Bank Annual Meetings (Singh 2013; *Times of India*, March 29, 2012). It also appears that there is a consensus among analysts and observers that China with its GDP that has risen from about equal to its four peers combined to more than 50 percent larger has emerged as the leader of the BRICS and other developing countries (Osei-Hwedie, 2008, p. 45; Reuters 2009). It is therefore hardly surprising that some of the BRIC's first major practical actions that drew world attention to the group as an emerging global force included the Cancun Ministerial Conference of 2003 where the developing nations formed a coalition against the industrialized countries, the deadlocked Doha Development Agenda, and the stalled trade-negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Osei-Hwedie, 2008; Nataraj, 2013).

An analysis of many of the BRICS' documents and key statements shows that their major objectives include commitment to better governance of the global economy and sustainable development, addressing the current global economic challenges, and reforming quota allocation in the IMF and World Bank to reflect the vision and interests of all members (Singh 2012, *Times of India*, March 29, 2012). While the BRICS are seeking to form a political force commensurate with their growing economic power, their aim is not to dismantle the current Western dominated post-World War II order and replace it with one controlled and dominated by them (Jacques, 2009; Escobar 2014; Schiavenza 2014). If that were the case, China would have become a hegemonic power as far back as 1200 AD when it was the most dominant nation in the world and long before the formation of the United States as a country and before Portugal and Britain 'discovered' Africa (Jacques, 2009; Wang and Rosenau, 2009; Mohan and Power, 2008). In other words, Beijing would have colonized Africa and dominated most of the world for 18 of the past 20 centuries the way Western states did between the eighteenth and twentieth century. Contrary to such an assertion, Chinese culture and civilization believe in the creation of a "harmonious world" based on shared development and common prosperity among different countries (Xinhua, May 21, 2009). The other BRICS' nations also share a commitment to a multi-polar world and emphasize respect for the authority of the United Nations (Weitz, 2011; Jacques, 2009).

Regarding the Africa-BRICS economic relations, China is the largest trading partner and its close relations with the continent are partly demonstrated by two watershed events: the November 2006 summit on Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing and the annual meeting of the African Development Bank (ABD) in Shanghai in May 2007 (Taylor, 2010). Since the Shanghai encounter, China released a white paper entitled "China's Africa Policy" and has been holding annual meetings with African states since then. The paper outlined the general terms and contours of Beijing's policies towards Africa that is based on "mutual benefits" and "win-win" results (Adem, 2013; Taylor, 2010; Wenping, 2007). These policies are also supposed to be applicable not only to the BRICS, but also to the rest of the world. It is therefore

not surprising that despite Russia's differences with Europe over Ukraine and the West's frequent criticism of China, both countries are playing a careful balancing act to maintain and try to expand their spheres of influence without compromising trade, commercial and political ties with the European Union (Escobar, 2014).

It is in this context that both countries are seeking to have close relations with Europe, and the Chinese are building a new "economic Silk Road" through the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe railway, a route from China to Kazakhstan, through Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany creating a "geopolitical earthquake" that is supposed to integrate economic growth across Eurasia (Escobar, 2014). Similarly, Moscow is undertaking the South Stream pipeline that will link the world's largest natural gas reserves in Russia with consumers in the European Union. On the other hand, China contends that the growing economic inequality between the rich and the poor countries is unjust and it undermines world peace and stability (Rosenau, 2009).

It is in this context that China and other BRICS' nations frequently and explicitly oppose trade protectionism on the part of the industrialized countries. Instead, they have been urging the West to forgive the debts of African and other developing countries, take more responsibility by granting greater market access to the developing countries, transferring technology, and providing more aid so that the developing countries can realize their full development potential (Wang and Rosenau, 2009). It is against this backdrop that the BRICS and the rest of the developing countries often take a common position on international issues and are supportive of China confronting the United States on matters such as the Korean peninsula (especially North Korea's nuclear program), Iran's nuclear program, the status of Taiwan, Tibet, climate change, and Washington's alleged human rights abuses (CNN News, January 19, 2011).

3. Achievements of the BRICS

With China in the forefront, the BRICS have demonstrated how geographically distant countries with different economic, political and social potentials and challenges can become partners and a force to be

reckoned with on the international arena. This is partly because they account for one sixth or an estimated \$17 trillion of the Global Domestic Product and hold \$4.8 trillion of the world's total foreign exchange (FX) reserves or nearly 40 percent (Singh, 2013; eNCA TV news, May 30, 2014). China alone has \$3.3 trillion in foreign currency reserves and is the United States' largest creditor, and the China Export-Import Bank is now the leading supplier of loans to Africa (Brautigam, 2010; Escobar, 2014). The global influence of the BRICS was partly acknowledged in 2011 when an independent United States panel mandated to review the Department of Defence Strategy confirmed the emergence of China as an important global power. The review noted that the rise of China and India implied that there was a rising multi-polar great power balance and that the two countries led the global economic recovery (<http://www.forum.globaltimes.cn/.forums/showthread.php?=&20878>).

For African states that lack power and influence on the global stage, the emergence of partnership with the BRICS is perceived as a favorable political development because the emerging powers are viewed as a positive and effective counterbalance to the United States and the West, and the group is able to play a very constructive and useful role in world affairs (Rothkopf, 2009). The five countries have also been praised for attempting to advance their cooperation based on openness, solidarity, mutual understanding and trust, promoting peace, security and development in a multipolar, inter-dependent and increasingly complex globalizing world (Das Kundu, 2012). Some analysts contend that the cooperation of the BRICS, especially between China and Russia and China and India, is generating a mixture of fear, panic, hysteria, and pugnaciousness in Washington and European capitals where governments still prefer to maintain the current global economic and political governance system that they dominate and that predominantly operates in their national interests (Escobar, 2014).

According to O'Neill, the BRICS' performance has not only exceeded all expectations but their impressive economic performance is illustrated by China surpassing Japan in 2010 to become the second largest economy in the world, while Brazil overtook the United Kingdom in 2012 to become the sixth (Follath, 2013). The BRICS now constitute the world's largest developing economies and the fastest growing

economies, whose recent growth has outpaced those of most developed nations in the past decade (UNCTAD, 2013). In addition, the FDI inflows to the five nations have more than tripled to an estimated US\$263 billion in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013). Their share in world FDI flows has also risen significantly, even during the financial crisis, reaching 20 percent in 2012, up from 6 percent in 2000 (Ibid.). The five countries have become increasingly attractive to foreign investors whose home economies have been experiencing economic slowdowns or stagnation. The UNCTAD (2013) figures show that the BRICS' outward FDI flows rose from US\$7 billion in 2000 to US\$126 billion in 2012, or nine percent of global flows. In the previous ten years the five countries' share of outward FDI flows was only one percent (Ibid.).

It is also widely acknowledged that multinational corporations from the BRICS' countries are also having a global impact in the economic sphere (Freemantle, 2009). At the same time, the BRICS see themselves as defenders of developing countries and promoters of their interests (Radebe, 2012). The BRICS countries are currently important sources and destinations of major foreign investments and they have already agreed on measures to facilitate trade and investment between them. Their relations should be understood as that of partners and/or competitors (Freemantle, 2009; Follath, 2013). Furthermore, intra-BRICS trade has risen tremendously. For instance, the bilateral trade between China and India grew 30-fold since 2000 and both countries have enjoyed phenomenal economic growth in the last 10 years (Ranade, 2015, BBC, Khadija, 2012). Also worth noting is the fact that between 2013 and 2014 South Africa which receives the largest share of FDI from China on the continent out performed its peers in certain areas and was second to China in terms of innovation and invention sophistication (eNCA TV news, May 30, 2014). However, this type of growth has since slowed in the last two years, but the economic influence of the BRICS continues to grow (Brautigam, 2010; Escobar, 2014).

Led by China, India and Brazil, developing nations have been hailed for often challenging the West over free trade during various trade negotiation rounds of the WTO (Reuters, 2009; *The Economist*, April 28, 2011). For the supporters of the BRICS, these developments and the stalemate in the Doha trade talks are perceived as moral "victo-

ries” for developing countries that are standing their ground against what is seen as Western exploitation (Mattoo, Ng and Subramanian, 2011). Additionally, The BRICS are using their collective might positively within the G-20 whose formation they were a part of the in 1999. By forcing concessions on trade, agriculture and subsidies from the US and the EU, these moves are regarded as a “victory” for the developing countries because global governance has dramatically improved and the role of emerging developing countries is being taken seriously (Jorgensen and Strube, 2014).

The rapid growing influence of the BRICS in Africa and globally is perceived as part of the reason why on his second trip to Africa, former President George W. Bush assured Africans that the United States was committed to the development of the continent and that he would embark on new measures to strengthen America’s relationship with Africa (Schaefer and Kim, 2008). President Barack Obama’s trips to the continent were also supposed to achieve the same goal as well as protect American interests (CNN News, July 28, 2015; Baker, 2015). The European response to the growing influence of the BRICS in Africa was the formation of The Africa-EU Partnership (Younis et. el., 2013; African Development Bank Group News, July 10, 2013). Both the EU and the US appear determined to ensure that the BRICS do not gain greater advantage over them in Africa. It is also argued that the EU’s objective of engaging with the BRICS and Africa on trade matters is partly aimed at promoting peace, security, and prosperity in the 21st century (Leal-Arcas, 2010).

In general, the BRICS have been credited with spearheading the global economic recovery after 2008 through their own development efforts (Yamakawa, Swarnali, and Kelston, et. al., 2009; Radebe, 2012). Some analysts now contend that China appears to be challenging the hegemonic position of the US and its allies as clearly demonstrated by Beijing’s growing influence around the world and the fact that it is now the EU’s and Africa’s largest trading partner (Wenping, 2007, CNN News, January 17, 2011). Others claim that another worry for the US and its allies is that the Chinese currency is already being used for trade in Hong Kong, Singapore, London and Frankfurt and it may be used to pay for Gazprom’s \$400 billion pipeline to China (Escobar, 2014). In addi-

tion, Escobar (2014) contends that a specter is haunting the West, especially Washington, with regard to any moves that signal a vision of a Sino-Russian alliance in the areas of expansive symbiosis of trade and commerce across much of Eurasian land at the expense of the United States.

Another significant development is that the BRICS are increasing their cooperation through avenues such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asian counterweight to NATO, and through the 120-member-nation Non-Aligned Movement. They are developing synergistic cooperation including new military technologies such as Russian sale of the state-of-the-art Sukhoi Su-35 jet fighters to the Chinese and Beijing and Moscow sealing an aviation-industrial partnership (Escobar, 2014). Escobar (2014) opines that America's "pivoting" to Asia to contain China through the US Navy control of the energy sea lanes to that country or NATO troops in Eastern Asia is likely to prevent China from attaining its self-described "peaceful development" strategy that is intended to turn it into a global powerhouse of trade. The BRICS countries are also noted for sticking to their historical missions of safeguarding world peace, promoting common development in line with their commitment to openness, inclusiveness, cooperation and win-win progress. It is therefore hardly surprising that China now has the most number of peacekeepers in Africa, and this is regarded as a positive contribution to peace on the continent (Adem, 2011).

Another major milestone in BRICS co-operation is that despite claims the group is merely a "talk-shop" they lived up to their promise and have formed a New Development Bank (NDB) with an initial capital of \$100 billion that will finance investments in infrastructure and development projects throughout the developing world (Heydarian, 2014). The BRICS also established a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) which is a framework for the provision of support through liquidity and precautionary instruments aimed at responding to actual or potential short-term balance of payments pressures. The Bank, which is supposed to complement and not rival the World Bank, as critics claim, is expected to focus on sustainable development with an emphasis on job creation and poverty alleviation. Some analysts believe the BRICS have an opportunity to succeed where the World Bank has failed (Evans,

2014). The NDB was partly formed as a result of IMF and World Bank refusal to change their voting shares, and some analysts claim that the big powers' multilateral forums like the World Bank are already carefully watching and even undermining, if not undercutting, the new BRICS initiatives (Schiavenza, 2014; Swaran, 2013).

The recent \$400 billion gas contract between China and Russia has been described as the deal of the century, which was reached after 20 years of difficult talks (Margolis, 2014). The huge deal that called for Russia to export 38 billion cubic meters of gas to China commences in 2018 and will be one of the largest global engineering projects linking the two countries through pipelines, and China will invest at least \$20 billion in Russian industry and boost imports of Russian products, notably military systems (Ibid). This will make China Russia's largest trading partner. Some analysts considered the deal as a big blow to the US and its Western allies who were attempting to isolate and punish Moscow for its recent actives in Ukraine (Margolis, 2014). Some analysts contend that this new deal is a major geopolitical event that now removes old fears and mistrust, and, most importantly, the Sino-Russian energy deal may further alter the world's balance of power to the East (Margolis, 2014).

On November 30, 2015, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund completed its regulatory five-year review of the basket of currencies constituting the special drawing rights (SDR). The Executive Committee determined that the Chinese renminbi met all required criteria for inclusion in the SDR. Effective on October 1, 2016, the renminbi will be a "freely usable currency" that will be included as the fifth currency in the SDR basket.

4. Benefits of Africa's Engagement with the BRICS

As alluded to earlier, the Africa-BRICS complex relations date back to the time when members of the group supported liberation movements in Africa. There is ample evidence that both parties have benefitted from their engagement as part of South-South cooperation based on the Chinese principle of "win-win" (Taylor, 2014; Brautigam, and Tang, 2011; Wenping, 2007; te Velde, 2010). The benefits in this

context are in terms of economic and political gains regarding whether or not African countries and their respective populations are better off engaging or not engaging with the BRICS. In other words, are there tangible positive gains by African states from the Africa-BRICS relations? If so, what are these benefits?

Some of the major positive developments have already been highlighted in the early part of this article and they do not negate the fact that the explosive growth in economic and trade activities in the Africa-BRICS relations has generated some challenges or impediments. Additionally, these developments are not an endorsement of the so-called 'Africa Rising' narrative, which has split many academics and commentators over whether the phenomenon is real or a myth (Shaikh and Soni, 2014). The other fact is that the general perception of the BRICS in Africa, including that of China, is not that of new colonizers but rather as development partners, investors, capacity builders, and tourists whose contribution to the continent is hardly disputed (Mogae, 2009; Taylor, 2010; McMillan, 2014; Youngman, 2014; Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2011). The five states have been credited with generating employment through their investments, transferring skills such as China sending 10,000 agricultural experts to Africa, and the manufacturing sector on the continent has started flourishing despite the fact that in a few cases this has led to unemployment and other controversies (McMillan, 2014; Taylor and Carmody, 2010). Many analysts have also concluded that although the BRICS, led by China, predominantly export manufactured goods to Africa where they mainly get raw materials, the relations are more equal and less exploitative than the traditional North-South relations (Taylor, 2014).

Additionally, the BRICS have become important development actors through their investments and provision of overseas development aid to Africa, which began at a time when trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) from the West were declining and the continent was perceived as being "hopeless" (*The Economist*, 2013; Kragelund, 2008 and Brautigam, 2010). The BRICS' resource demand has increased Africa's strategic global importance and value (Freemantle, 2009). It is also worth noting that despite much of the attention given to China and India, South Africa is credited with being the main source of most of the-

BRICS' African investments (Taylor, 2010; Mbaye, 2010; Freemantle, 2009 and DefenceWeb, July 23, 2010). The significance of the BRICS' investments in Africa is partly reflected by the fact that the continent now has seven of the fastest growing economies in the world (*Economist*, 2013, Fortin, 2013). This is partly the reason why Chinese economic zones, loans, trade, investments, infrastructure such as hospitals, houses, dams, airports, roads, stadiums and educational facilities have been praised as a promising new approach and catalyst to sustainable industrialization; albeit with some political, economic and social challenges (Vhumbunu, 2014; te Velde, 2010; Kragelund, 2010 and Rowlands, 2012).

The benefits of the Africa-BRICS relations are further illustrated by statistics showing that in 2013 Sino-Africa trade reached \$201 billion and there were 2,500 Chinese companies operating in Africa (eNCA TV News, May 30, 2014). The Environmental Investigation Agency (2013) notes that in 2011, the balance of trade favored Africa, whose exports to China totalled \$93.2 billion compared with imports of \$73.1 billion. In general, the BRICS have now become significant investors in Africa and their share in the continent's FDI stock and flows reached 14 percent and 25 percent, respectively, in 2010 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, March 25, 2013). Furthermore, the BRICS' exports to the continent have increased tremendously and according to the Africa Development Bank (2013), the group is now Africa's largest trading partner. The Bank also notes that the partnership between India and Africa has significantly promoted the development of small - and medium-scale enterprises on the continent while Brazil and Russia have been heavily involved in the mining and energy industry through public-private partnerships that are contributing to the improvement of people's lives.

One of the reasons why African governments prefer doing business with companies from the BRICS is because they are usually less expensive and they complete projects quickly than their European and US rivals (Haglund, 2009; Financial Times, September 13, 2010). In the case of China, African nations have been doing business with Beijing because it offers less aid and more loans and business opportunities. China is credited for continuing to trade with Africa in the 1970s,

1980s and 1990s at a time when major Western companies and countries were pulling out of the continent mainly due to collapsing mineral prices that resulted in their development aid being halved by 1977 (Spears, 2009; Servant, 2005; Bwalya, 2013). In addition, in 2006 Beijing made huge pledges of aid to Africa when Western nations were doing very little to help and at the time when Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, promised \$10 billion of cheap loans, offered debt forgiveness, new hospitals, professional training for 15,000 Africans, and a doubling of aid between 2006 and 2009 (Cammack, 2006). With US\$3.3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, China is regarded as an alternative source of aid, with no strings attached, for developing nations (Schiavenza, 2014; *Asian Times*, March 27, 2010).

Moreover, despite the fact that the total FDI in Africa fell by about a third between 2008 and 2009, Chinese investments in Africa are reported to have increased by 80 percent while Brazil is reported to have invested \$10 billion since 2003 (BBC News Online, 2009; *Hindustan Times*, November 8, 2009). In addition, Brazil has cooperation agreements with 30 African countries and is a major agricultural exporter to African countries like Egypt, and now has more embassies in Africa than Britain which previously dominated the continent. The BRICS countries are also becoming important development partners for Africa by investing in both the continent's rich and poor resourced countries. In terms of clean technology, Brazil's "ethanol diplomacy" is being promoted in countries including Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa, with the aim of establishing a global market for biofuels based on Brazilian technology that is likely to benefit the continent (Plagemann, 2015).

With regard to international economic issues, African nations often agree with Beijing that neo-liberal policies based on the Washington consensus are ineffective and less relevant to developing economies. In this context, China has marketed itself as an alternative economic model for development and economic transition that does not involve various preconditions such as foreign advisors, institutions or bilateral mentors, and this is seen as a refreshing alternative (Free-mentle, 2009; Bilal et. al, 2006; Radhika, 2013; Yamakawa et al. 2009; Layne, 2009; Escobar, 2014; Vhumbunu, 2014; Wenping, 2007). The

neoliberal model led by the US is rejected partly because the American economy has witnessed boom and collapse leading to, among other things, deindustrialization, and the number of consumer goods growing exponentially while the number of consumers who are able to afford them has been declining (Lemma, 2013; Snyder, 2010). It is also argued that African nations are no longer interested in traditional Western aid programs that often entailed economic and political restructuring (Bilal et. al, 2006; Fourie, 2011; Rowlands, 2012).

Another reason accounting for the attraction of the Chinese model is that despite criticisms regarding the increase in the gap between the rich and the poor in China and India, between 1978 and 2015, Beijing lifted between 500 million to 600 million people out of poverty from a population of more than 1.3 billion and is geared to eliminating the number living below the poverty-line by 2020 (<http://www.WorldBank.org/en/country/china/overview>; CCTV.com 2014). In the case of India, the population of the poor has declined from 407 million in 2004/05 to approximately 269 million in 2011/12, (Anand, et. El, 2014). According to an OECD report (2013), over the last ten years and despite the imposition of US and European sanctions, Russia has also made progress in reducing poverty and narrowing its per capita income levels with Western nations, even though this was largely attributed to rising oil prices rather than the result of economic transition.

With regard to Brazil, in spite of the recent (2015) social unrest including the unrest in which protesters called for the president's impeachment, since 2003 the Brazilian Workers Party governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rouseff have made important social gains including the reduction in unemployment and poverty by more than half and more than tripling education and health spending (Telesurtv, August 7, 2015). According to Bond (2014), the smallest member of the BRICS, South Africa, which receives the largest FDIs on the continent, has made slow social and economic progress because of the greedy elites, industrial strikes, and the so-called unpatriotic white English-speaking bourgeoisie who have invested their money in Western capitals. It is also true that in the last two years or so, as with most parts of the world, the progress in the BRICS countries has slowed largely due to the unfavorable global economic situation (Bond, 2014, Taylor 2014). In general, it

is widely acknowledged that most of the BRICS countries have adopted innovative economic and social policies that have led to considerable social development gains, and this has made them role models for other developing nations (Younis et. el., 2013).

President Barack Obama of the United States recently acknowledged that there have been improvements in democratic governance, economic development, and living standards of many people in Africa who would otherwise have no income if it were not for the new investments that have obviously mostly come from the BRICS (CNN News, July 28, 2015). Another positive development is a report by the African Development Bank revealing that the number of consumers who can be termed "middle class" on the continent has grown to approximately 313 million, which is a 60 percent increase in the last decade (Fortin, 2013). Conversely, this development has increased the gap between the rich and the poor, but this is not only an African phenomenon because the same trend has occurred in many developed countries including the United States (Lema, 2013; Stiglitz, 2013).

There is also significant evidence that despite the fact that African states are portrayed as helpless victims of new colonialism, many countries have negotiated and they have even shaped their engagement with the BRICS in important ways and thereby carving out more opportunities than is often recognized (Mohan and Lampert, 2012). Therefore, the Afro-opportunists argue that the continent has both challenges and opportunities. Africa has a lot of potential, and although the continent only account for just one percent of global manufacturing there is tremendous room for improvement and opportunities. This is supported by the fact that Africa possesses 12 percent of the world's oil reserves, 40 percent of global gold, and between 80 and 90 percent of chromium and platinum (Mbae, 2014; Fortin 2013). According to UNCTAD (2013), Africa also has 60 percent of the world's underutilized arable land and huge timber resources.

5. Criticism of the BRICS as Group

As noted earlier, one of the major criticisms directed at the BRICS is that they are a mere artificial construct with less common so-

cial, economic and political factors and interests, and whose demise is inevitable because they have too many intra and intergroup disagreements and problems (Pant, 2013; Sharma, 2012; Follath, 2013). Consequently, it is argued that the group is not a good role model for other developing countries or a force to reckon with at the international level (Kragelund, 2010; Simha, 2013; Stuenkel, 2012; *The Economist*, January 14, 2012). Opponents of the BRICS charge that these nations have joined the new “scramble for Africa” whose consequences are quite dire because they and the Western companies and banks are involved in corruption and are colluding in stripping the continent’s resources (Burgis 2015; Mohan and Power 2008; Hengaria, 2012; Odoom, 2011; and te Velde, 2010). Bond (2014) who dismisses the narrative of Africa rising as a “myth” claims that the BRICS are agents of “sub-imperialists” who are in “bed with their enemies” (US/EU/Bretton Woods/WTO, imperialism) on virtually “all fundamental issues” such as world finance, trade and extraction of the continents resources and climate politics (Bond, 2014a). Some analysts and commentators have also expressed concern and were worried that the continent was not far from being consumed by “dragon-fire” (Isaacson, 2009; Business Daily, January 6, 2007; Taylor 2006; Taylor, 2007; Tull, 2006). Some trade union leaders, opposition leaders, newspapers, and scholars have also expressed these fears and warnings of “re-colonization” that Freemantle (2009) has called “hype” in Africa. Critics including former South African President Thabo Mbeki have warned of China’s alleged attempts to colonize the continent (Brooks 2007, Taylor 2010). President Barack Obama, like his former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, recently echoed this view (Baker, 2015). The critics contend that China lacks transparency regarding the conditions it attaches to the loans, aid, and projects involving African countries and that such aid usually “tied” to hospitals, infrastructure development or equipment sold by Chinese companies amount to a “trap” (Bilal et. al, 2006; te Velde, 2010; Osei-Hwedie, 2008; Lemma, 2013; Snyder, 2010). It is also argued that such “aid” is in fact loans at near-commercial rates while the Chinese workmanship is of very poor quality, and the same applies to Chinese goods sold in Africa. The BRICS as a group have also been criticized for seemingly lacking a common agenda regarding aid (Rowlands, 2012).

Even the creation of the BRICS bank has been criticized by some because it is allegedly dominated by China and is supposedly aimed at serving Beijing's interests (Schiavenza, 2014). It is argued that China is the world's second-largest economy and with a larger GDP than the other four BRICS combined, economies that are China's largest trading partners. China's contribution of \$100 billion to the new Bank is forty percent or twice the amount that each member contributed, and the implications of this is obvious (Schiavenza, 2014). In this context, some opponents of the BRICS claim that each country is seeking global power status and others claim that China is merely using other members of the group to achieve this goal and will abandon them once it attains its objective (Sharma, 2012; Plagemann, 2015; Heydarian, 2014).

There are also allegations that some of the BRICS' broader differences are well documented, including China's military modernization, which could cause war within the group. In the case of Beijing's disputes with its neighbours in the China-Sea, it could lead to a conflict involving the United States that would jeopardize the group's future and the world (CNN News, September 9, 2015; Lord and Erickson 2014; Al Jazeera, May 31, 2014; Harding, 2009; Foresight, February 19, 2010; Defence News, November 28, 2010). The other bottlenecks that are cited as possible hindrances to the BRICS attaining their goals include political instability, social, ecological and political battles, rampant corruption, environmental threats, conflicts with minority internal Muslims populations (Russia, India and China), international trade frictions, and dilapidated infrastructures (Bond, 2014; Faulconbridge, 2008; Stuenkel, 2012; *The Hindu*, Monday, June, 8, 2009). In the case of Africa, it is argued that many states are facing serious challenges regarding corruption, poor governance, violence, terror and organised crime. These events are constraining economic development (Bond, 2014; Du Plessis, 2015).

The emerging nations, especially China and to a lesser extent India, have been accused of providing very poor working conditions, not supporting the enforcement actions of human rights abroad, turning a blind eye to such abuses at home and in Africa where their non-conditional financial dealing and investments are said to be threatening democratization agendas of the Organization for Economic Co-

operation and Development (OECD) and specifically its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors (Wenping, 2007; Abdenur and Neto, 2013; World Report 2015; Patel, 2012). Furthermore, Beijing is accused of using its policy of “non-interference” to do business and sell arms to dictators such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Omar Al Bashir Sudan who has been accused of genocide and crimes against humanity (BBC News, June 15, 2015; Taylor and Carmody, 2010; Osei-Hwedie 2008; *Asian Times*, March 27, 2010; Brautigam 2010; Bond 2006; Adem, 2011; Bond, 2014a). In a few cases, Indian companies operating in Africa have also been accused of ignoring human rights, (Jayadeva, 2015; Bwalya, 2013; Lusaka Times, August 4, 2015 and Times of Zambia, November 8, 2006).

Other critics contend that the only way the BRICS will be able to achieve their objectives is by forming a legal organization (Delyagin, 2011; Taylor 2014). In this context, it argued that the BRICS have no influence even as members of the G-20 because the organization is dominated by the rich Western countries and it lacks accountability and transparency. This is primarily because the G-20 still excludes 85 percent of the world’s countries (Luce, 2009). Others claim that the BRICS have not yet learned to appreciate their global role and to become an active international group, which is the reason why they respond to issues as they arise instead of being architects of the new world order (Delyagin, 2011). Some opponents of the emerging nations, including Leal-Arcas (2010), claim that the attitude of the BRICS countries to multilateralism and responsibility in global governance is still questionable or unclear, while Samuelson (2004) argues that China has never candidly accepted the basic rules governing the international economic system and only follows those rules when they suit its interests and rejects, modifies, or ignores them when they do not.

Furthermore, the BRICS are accused of making joint statements regarding the need for conflicts around the world to be settled through negotiations or diplomacy without taking any practical action on issues such as the nuclear controversies surrounding Iran and North Korea and the civil wars in Libya and Syria (Kundu, 2012; Marcus and Alves, 2012; Carmody, 2009; Taylor, 2009). China, Russia and South Africa have been castigated for vetoing a United Nations Security Council resolution

that sought to condemn violence and impunity in Syria and allegedly preventing pressures on human rights abusers everywhere, (Shetty 2011).

6. Reactions to the Criticisms of the BRICS' Relations with Africa

One of the major responses to critics of the BRICS is that those who are aware of African's long historical interactions with the West cannot believe that the emerging nations and a country like China can do business with the continent on the basis of a "win-win relationship" and achieve significant development objectives (Bilal et. al, 2006). Proponents of the BRICS argue that many of the criticisms are based on ignorance of Beijing's and the BRIC's relations with Africa (Brautigam, 2010; Jacques, 2009). Other critics of the group are accused of purposely disregarding the positive developments and historical facts that include the continued Western exploitation of the continent (Southall and Melber 2009). China, for example, became an energy importer in 1993; yet Sino-Africa relations have developed steadily since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) in 1949 when Beijing started supporting liberation movements on the continent and when the issues of oil or minerals were not part of their relations (Wenping, 2007; *The Guardian*, November 9, 2009; Brautigam, 1998 and Sharma, 2012).

Another important point is that long before the recent claims that the BRICS are deindustrializing Africa and causing income inequalities, Mehdi Shafaeddin, a senior economist at UNCTAD, had pointed out that developing countries and particularly those from Africa were being increasingly marginalized in international trade through trade liberalisation and by the IMF and World Bank policies resulting in deindustrialization (quoted in Raghavan, 1996; Du Plessis and Mabuza, 2005). Raghavan (1991;1996 and 2014b) contends that the deindustrialization in much of the developing world including Africa is due to liberalization, exchange rate appreciation and high interest rates and other symptoms of austere policy. On the other hand, there is evidence that claims that the BRICS are deindustrializing diversifying Africa's dependence are a myth because they are not based on facts and the opposite is actually true. The emerging nations have committed them-

selves to partnerships for integration and industrialization of the continent (McMillan, 2014; Youngman, 2014; African Development Bank Group News, July10, 2013).

Equally important is the observation that, aware of their value, African states are able to dictate the rules of the game, something that was previously impossible” (Freemantle, 2009). In addition, contrary to the popular view that African states, especially the oil rich states, are ‘dependent’ and ‘pliant’ and lack any leverage or agency to resist the exploitative relations with the BRICS, the reality is more complicated. There is evidence that many African countries have demonstrated that they are able to defend and prioritize their economic and national interests in their dealings with the BRICS, especially Chinese oil companies by suspending permits or withdrawing operating licenses (Obi, 2014). At the same time, the evidence shows that despite frequent claims that China is the largest investor and exploiter because it has the largest number of companies in Africa, this is not true, nor is the allegation that Beijing has only invested in oil rich, natural gas and minerals resourced countries (Freemantle, 2009; Jacques, 2009; Brautigam, 2010; Escobar 2014; Schiavenza, 2014; Burgis, 2015). The fact is that European and US multinationals are still the largest investors and Chinese companies have been investing in oil fields in areas where Western companies have little interest. It should be noted that Beijing has also balanced energy trade with aid, investing in infrastructure, sanitation, electricity power and health to the tune of approximately \$4 billion (Wenping 2007, p. 29).

The assertions of serious disputes among the BRICS that are supposed to contribute to the demise of the group also appear to be exaggerated. A good example is the fact that the BRICS supported Russia’s position on Crimea and they have stood by the Kremlin (Keck, 2014). Another illustration is that despite allegations of grave disputes between China and Russia partly because Beijing has been selling weapons to other Russian clients such as Venezuela, Pakistan, Ecuador and Iran, it is also not true since the largest buyers of Russian weapons are China and India with the former accounting for 70 percent of the sales to both countries (Foresight, February 19, 2010 and Defence News, November 28, 2010). More importantly is the fact that Russia and

China's relations have been increasing, as demonstrated by the recent \$400 billion gas deal between the two nations (Margolis, 2014). In general, there appears to be a consensus among many observers and experts that China and Russia are enjoying unprecedented strategic relations including joint military exercises such as those held in 2009 that were considered their largest exercises (Harding, 2009).

Moreover, the popular charges that the BRICS and in particular claims that Chinese investments in Africa are seriously threatening those of the West have been dismissed as untrue by many analysts because in reality the vast majority of the investments in Africa are from the West, Malaysia and South Africa (Taylor, 2010; Mbaye, 2010; Freemantle, 2009; Reuters, March 25, 2013 and Defence Web, July 23, 2010). Moreover, the BRICS' investments in Africa is only 4 percent of their total FDI outflows, which in 2012 was 25 percent of all the inflows to the continent and they accounted for nearly one tenth of global investment outflows (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, March, 25, 2013). Equally important is the fact although China is accused of selling the largest quantity of arms to Africa, the US, and recently Russia, are the largest exporters of arms the continent and around the world (Loewenstein, 2015, Freemantle 2009). In addition, in terms of military spending, the US spends more on defence than all other nations combined (Loewenstein, 2015).

With regard to changing global governance, proponents of the BRICS contend that those who accuse the group of doing very little forget that the current world institutions are dominated by the West which is vigorously defending the status quo (Singh, 2013). The US and its allies who have traditionally held the top executive positions in most multilateral organizations by proposing and endorsing their own candidates have largely undermined these moves. This was clearly exhibited when Christine Lagarde was elected as the new managing director of the IMF and Jim Yong Kim as the new president of the World Bank, respectively (BBC News, April 17, 2012 and BBC News June 28, 2011). On the other hand, criticisms of the lack of unity appear to be contradicted by the fact that the BRICS have demonstrated after every summit since 2008 by declaring common positions on international issues and use them as an opportunity to strengthen their ties among themselves and

with developing nations including Africa. The general view is that the five countries' relations appear to be growing from strength to strength as witnessed by the formation of the NDB (Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010; Ighobor, 2013).

Finally, regarding the fears of a possible war between the US and China, both parties have dismissed such threats and insisting that despite their differences on a number of issues they are partners and competitors and not rivals. Both countries emphasize that they have cooperative, constructive and mutual beneficial relations (Sky News, January 20, 2011; BBC News, January 19, 2011). Recently, President Barack Obama clearly stated that the US and China alone cannot sort out many global problems such as climate change because they require the urgent attention and action of all states (eNCA News, September 1, 2015). In addition, the two nations have agreed to work together and strengthen cooperation and consultation on various other international issues including security in the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East, international terrorism, intellectual property rights, prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and so on (BBC News, January 19, 2011; Xinhua May 21, 2009). It should also be noted that China is the largest holder of US government bonds. Washington is in a dilemma because, "how do you talk tough with your banker" and would China risks its financial investment and economic relations with the United States? (Al Jazeera, January 18, 2011). Moreover, there is now a bizarre situation where both the US and the EU, who are very critical of the Kremlin's activities in Ukraine and want the regime of President Bashar al-Assad toppled, are fighting on the same side as Russia in an attempt to defeat the so-called Islamic terrorist groups in Syria (CNN News, 15 September 2015).

7. Conclusion

From the preceding analysis, it is clear the Africa-BRICS relations are beneficial for both parties. Despite the various challenges and predictions of the demise of the group, the future appears to be bright. It is up to Africans, not the outside world, to evaluate their relationship with foreign powers and to decide what is in their best interest (Freemantle 2009 and Ademola et, al 2009; Mogae, 2009). It is also clear that the Africa-BRICS relationship presents numerous challenges and opportunities that need to be addressed, and a lot of effort is already being

devoted to address these issues (Follath, 2013; CNN News, January 22, 2013). It is also true that a great deal remains to be done especially in the area of structural transformation, industrialization and fighting corruption. In addition, many analysts now believe that Africa's future is bright partly because the young people who make up more than half of the continent's population are ambitious and optimistic, and partly because the Africa-BRICS relationship has improved the perception of the continent as one of the world's important economic and trade investment destination. Africans must organize themselves and negotiate very well in order to improve their terms of trade so that they are able to protect their natural resources, other commodities, services and interests that include improving the ordinary people's lives. Finally, considering that the BRICS constitute an infant pressure group, it is premature to make a conclusive and detailed assessment of their long-term relationship with Africa and impact on the international arena as new centers of global power. Consequently, their future and influence will remain speculative and will continue to be debated for a long time.

REFERENCES

- A World Bank Group Flagship Report (2015) *Global Economic Prospects*, June 2015, The World Bank Washington, D. C.
- Abdenur, E. A. and Neto, de Souza M. D (2013) "Brazil's Development Cooperation with Africa: What Role for Democracy and Human Rights," Edição V. 10 - N. 19 – Dez.
- Achibugi, D. (2009) "The G-20 Ought to be Increased to Six Billion," *Open Democracy-open Economy*.
- Adem, Seifudein editor (2013) *China's Diplomacy in Eastern and Southern Africa*, Surrey: Ashgate.
- Adem, Seifudein (2011) Sociology of Discourse on China-Africa Relations," *Global Development Studies*, Volume 6, Winter-Spring, Numbers 3-4, pp. 1-24.
- African Development Bank Group News (2013) "Africa and the BRICS: A Win-Win Partnership?" July 10, 2013.

Anand R., Volodymyr T., and Kumar N. (2014) *India: Defining and Explaining Inclusive Growth and Poverty Reduction*, IMF Working Paper WP/14/63, Asia and Pacific Department, Washington, D. C.

Asian Times (2012) "Brics Summit Exposes the High Wall Between India and China," April 3, 2012.

Baker, Peter (2015) "Obama, on China's Turf, Presents U.S. as a Better Partner for Africa," *New York Times*, July 29, 2015.

BBC News (2014) "Ukraine Crisis: Russia and Sanctions," December 19, 2014.

BBC News (2015) "Chechnya Profile," August 18, 2015.

BBC News (2015) June 15, 2015.

BBC News Online (2009) "Provide \$10 billion to Africa," November 8, 2009.

Bilal, Sanoussi and Szepesi, Stefan (2006) "How Regional Economic Communities Can Facilitate Participation in the WTO: The Experience of Mauritius and Zambia" in Gallagher Peter, Low Patrick and Stoler, L. eds Andrew. *Challenges of WTO Participation Case Studies*, Geneva: World Trade Organization.

Bond, P (2013) "Africa 'Rising' South Africa Lifting or The Reverse?" *Daily Maverick*, February 6, 2013.

Bond, P. (2014a) "'Africa Rising' From Above—or Uprising from Below?" Paper Presented to the Frelimo School and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Policy Forum the Role of Ruling Parties in Promoting Sustainable Economic Development: Thinking Beyond GDP, Maputo, Mozambique, May 29, 2014.

Bond, P (2014b) "The BRICS: Yash Tandon Asks Tough Questions – Which We all Need to Ponder," *Pambazuka*, Issue 68, June 11, 2014.

Bond, P. (2006) *Looting Africa*, London: Zed Books.

Brautigam, D. (1998) *Chinese Aid and African Development Exporting Green Revolution*, London: Palgrave Macmillan

Brautigam, D (2010) *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brookes, Peter (2007) "Into Africa: China's Grab for Influence and Oil," The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lecturers, No 1006, March 26, 2007.

Burgis, T (2015) *The Looting Machine: Warlords, Tycoons, Smugglers and the Systematic Theft of Africa's Wealth*, London: Harper Collins Publishers.

Bwalya, Edgar (2013) "Zambia-China," in Adem, Seifudein ed. (2013) *China's Diplomacy in Eastern and Southern Africa*, Surrey: Ashgate.

Cammack, D. (2006) "China-China Relations," and the Politics of Development in Africa," London: Overseas Development Institute, 76, November.

Carmody, P. and Taylor, I. (2010) "Flexigemony and Force in China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Sudan and Zambia Compared." *Geopolitics*, Volume 15, Number 3, pp. 496-515.

CCTV.com (2014) "China has lifted 600 million People out of Poverty," October 18, 2014.

China–Africa Relations, *African Affairs*, 112/446, pp.92–110.

CNN News, 2014.

Cyril, Obi (2014) "Oiling Neo-colonialism and Conflict? The implications of China's Engagements with African Petro-states for Peace and Development. Accessed from <http://china-africa.ssrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/obi-Final.pdf>.

Das Kundu, N. (2012) "BRICS Focused on Partnership, Stability, Security and Prosperity," March 29. Accessed from <http://valdaiclub.com/asia/40660.html>.

Das Kundu, Nividita (2012) "BRICS Focused on Partnership, Stability, Security and Prosperity," March 29, <http://valdaiclub.com/asia/40660.html>

DefenceWeb, July 23, 2010

Delyagin, Mikhail "BRICS – Key Objectives," October 11, 2011.

Du Plessis, A. (2015) "Violence and Conflict on World Economic Forum Agenda," *Business Day*, June 4, 2015.

Du Plessis, Louise and Mabuza, Charles (2005) "Free Trade and Competition Policy in Africa Competition Commission of South Africa," paper delivered at the Economic Society of South Africa Biennial Conference Durban, September 7-9, 2005.

Elumelu, O. T. (2013) "Africa: Obama the Africapitalist - Creating a Private Sector Development Model for the World to Follow," *All Africa*, July 8, 2013.

eNCA TV (2015) June 3.

Engardio, P. and Arndt, M (2006) "Emerging Giants," *Business Week*, July 31 2006.

Escobar, P. (2014) "The Birth of a Eurasian Century: Russia and China do Pipelineistan." Accessed from <http://rt.com/op-edge/160160-pipelineistan-brics-economy>

Evans, J. (2014) "The Brics have a Chance to Succeed Where the World Bank Has Failed," *The Guardian*, July 29, 2014.

Faulconbridge G., (2008) "BRICs Helped by Western Finance Crisis: Goldman," *Reuters*, June 8, 2008.

Faulconbridge, G. and Stott, M. (2009) "Crisis Speeds BRIC Rise to Power: Goldman's O'Neill," *Reuters*, June 9, 2009.

Follath, E. (2013) "Goldman Sachs' Jim O'Neill: BRICS Have Exceeded All Expectations," *Spiegel Online*, March 21, 2013.

Foresight, February 19, 2010.

Fortin, J. (2013) "Surprise! Africa's Fastest-Growing Foreign Direct Investor Is Now," *Africa International Business Times*, May 8, 2013.

Freemantle, S. Stevens and J (2013) "BRICS Africa Trade is flourishing, and Africa Remains a Pivot," *Insight and Strategy*, February 12, 2013.

Fourie Elsje, (2011) "Africa Looks to Learn from East Asia's Development Experiences," *The Guardian*, September 28, 2011.

Gallagher, P. L. and Andrew L. S eds. (2005) *Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation Case Studies*, Geneva: World Trade Organization.

Haglund, D. (2009) "In it for the long Term? Governance and Learning Among Chinese Investors in Zambia's Copper Sector," *The China Quarterly*, Number 199, pp. 627-646.

Harding, L. (2009) "Russia Fears Embrace of Giant Eastern Neighbor," *The Observer*, August 2, 2009.

Hengaria, Afredo Tjiurimo (2012) "The European Union and Global Emerging Powers in Africa: Containment, Competition or Cooperation?" *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 19, Issue 1, pp. 1-24.

Heydarian, J. R. (2014) "The BRICS Bank: Multipolarity or Beijing Consensus?" *Aljazeera News*, July 21, 2014.

Hindustan Times (2009) "China Pleases \$ 10bn Africa Loans," November 8, 2009.

<http://www.africa-eu.partnership>

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/06/08/us-russia-forum-bricidUSL071126420080608?>

<http://www.telesurtv.net/english/telesuragenda/Understanding-BrazilPolitical-Crisis-20150611-0029>.

<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview> "China has lifted 600 million people out of poverty."

Ighobor, Kingsley (2013) "China in the Heart of Africa," *Africa Renewal*, January, p. 13.

Jacques, M. (2009) *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*, London: Penguin Books.

Johannes, J. (2015) "Review: Ian Taylor, Africa Rising? BRICS – Diversifying Dependency," *Africa Spectrum*, Volume 50, Number 1, pp. 15-118.

Jorgensen, H- and Strube (2014) "China, the G20 and Global Economic Governance," Lowy Institute for International Policy: Sydney, November.

Keck, Z. (2014) "Why Did BRICS Back Russia on Crimea? The BRICS's support for Russia Shows the Western-dominated Post-Cold War Order is Eroding," *The Diplomat*, March 31, 2014.

Khadija, Sharife (2012) "The Drunken Logic of Eco-Tourism," *The Africa Report*, March 15, 2012.

Kragelund P. (2008) "The Return of Non-DAC Donors to Africa: New Prospects for African Development?" *Development Policy Review*, Volume 26, Issue 5, pp. 555–584, September.

Kragelund, P. (2010) for Trade and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper 11. Accessed from <http://ictsd.org/downloads/2011/03/the-potential-role-of-non-traditional-donors-28099-aid-in-africa.pdf>.

Kragelund, P. (2011) "Back to BASIC? The Rejuvenation of Non-Traditional Donors," *Journal Development and Change*, Volume 42, pp. 585-607.

Leal-Arcas, Rafael (2010) China's Attitude to Multilateralism in International Economic Law and Governance: Challenges for the World Trading System," *Journal of World Investment and Trade*, Volume 11, Number 2, pp. 259-273.

Leigh, D. and Pallister D. (2005) "Revealed: The New Scramble for Africa," *The Guardian*, June 1, 2005.

Lema, Rasmus and Berger, Axel and Schmitz, Hubert, (2013) "China's Impact on the Global Wind Power Industry" *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, Volume 42, Number 1, 2013, p. 37-69.

Lemma, Solome (2013) "Against the Gospel of "Africa Rising" Africa is a Country," November 6, 2013. Accessed from <http://africasacountry.com/against-the-gospel-of-africa-rising/>

Loewenstein, A. (2015) "The Global Arms Race Between the US and China is Devastating Africa and the Middle East," *Mondo Weiss*, July 23, 2015.

Lord, C. and Erickson S. A. (2014) "Bases for America's Asia-Pacific Rebalance," *The Diplomat*. Accessed from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/bases-for-america-asia-pacific-rebalance-part-2>.

Luce, Edward 2009 "New Body takes on Economic Leadership," *Financial Times*, September 25, 2009.

Lusaka Times (2015) "Parallel Protests Carried Out in India, Zambia and U.K Against Vedanta," August 4, 2015.

Mahajan, V. (2008) *Africa Rising: How 900 Million African Consumers Offer More Than You Think*, New Jersey, Pearson Prentice Hall.

Margolis, E. (2014) "The Great Western Gas Fiasco." Accessed from <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article38598.htm>.

Mattoo, A. & Ng F. & Subramanian, A. (2011) "The Elephant in the 'Green Room:' China and the Doha Round," Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Policy Briefs, pp. 11-13.

Mbae, L. (2014) *Industrialization in Africa: Can the Continent Make It?* Tony Elumelu Foundation, March 4, 2014. Accessed from <http://tonyemelufoundation.org/articles/industrialization-africa-can-the-continent-make>.

Mbaye, Sanou (2010) "Africa Will not put up with a Colonialist China," *The Guardian*, February 7, 2010.

McMillan, M. (2014) "The Myth of De-industrialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa," *This Is Africa Online*, May 20, 2014.

Mogae, F. (2009) "A New Development Partner: New Opportunities," in *China, Africa and the Diaspora: Perspectives*, edited by Freedman S.T. Washington DC: AaSbea Publishers.

Mohan, G. and Lampert B (2012) "Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency," *Africa Affairs*, Volume 112, Issue 446, pp. 921-10.

Mohan, G. and Power M. (2008) "New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement in Africa and the Changing Architecture of International Development," *Review of African Political Economy*, Volume 35, Number 1, pp. 23-42.

Nkoana-Mashabane, M. (2012) "South Africa's Role in BRICS, and Its Benefits to Job Creation and the Infrastructure Drive in South Africa," Speech presented at The New Age Business Briefing, Johannesburg, South Africa, September 11, 2012.

Obeng-Odoom, Franklin (2011) "The Oil Curse Revisited: Governments, Oil, and Corporations in Africa" Paper presented at the 2011 KAPA-ASPA International Conference in Seoul, Korea on October 28th and 29th.

Obi C. (2009) "Scrambling for Oil in West Africa?" Southall Rodger ed. and H. Melber in *A New Scramble for Africa?* Scottsville, South Africa: University of Kwazulu Natal Press.

Obi, C. (2010) "African Oil in the Energy Security Calculations of China and India," in Cheru Fantu and Obi, Cyril eds. (2010) *The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions*, London, UK: Zed Books.

OECD (2013) "Better Policies" Series Russia Modernising the Economy April," OECD: Paris.

OECD (2013) *Economic Survey of the Russian Federation 2014*, Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Osei-Hwedie, B. Z. (2011) "China's Role in Africa's Conflict Resolution, Peace-keeping and Peacebuilding," *Global Development Studies*, 6, Numbers 3-4, Winter, pp. 99-132.

Pambazuka News (2004) "Africa and the UN Security Council Permanent Seats," Issue 204, May 28, 2004.

Pant, V. H. (2013) "The BRICS Fallacy," *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 36, Number 3, pp. 91-105.

Patel, K. (2012) "Brics Summit Exposes the High Wall between India and China," *The Maverick*, March 30, 2012.

Peter, B. (2015) "Obama, on China's Turf, Presents U.S. as a Better Partner for Africa," *New York Times*, July 29, 2015.

Power, M. and A. Alves (editors) (2012) *China and Angola A Marriage of Convenience?* Cape Town, Dakar, Nairobi, and Oxford: Pambazuka Press.

Radebe, H. (2012) "BRICS a Force for World Peace, Says China," *Financial Mail*, August 8, 2012.

Radhika, Desai (2013) "The Brics are Building a Challenge to Western Economic Supremacy," *The Guardian*, April 2, 2013.

Raghavan, C. (1991) *Recolonization Third World Network*, Penang, Malaysia.

Raghavan, C. (1996) Africa: Trade Liberalization Causes De-industrialization, South-North Development Monitor, March 8, 1996.

Raghavan, C. (2014a) Address to the Committee of the Whole (of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board) preparing for UNCTAD-X Statement on behalf of Third World Network, Geneva, October 25, 2014.

Raghavan, C. (2014b) *The Third World in the Third Millennium CE*, Third World Network: Penang, Malaysia.

Ranade, J. (2015) "More Wiggle Room on Tibet: Beijing Reaching out to Dalai Lama," *Hindustan Times*, January 6, 2015.

Reuters (2013) "Malaysia, not China, is Asia's Top Investor in Africa," March 25, 2013.

Rothkopf, D. (2009) "What would the BRICS be without China?" *Foreign Policy*, June 15, 2009.

Rowlands, D. (2012) "Individual BRICS or a Collective Bloc? Convergence and Divergence Among "Emerging Donor" Nations," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Volume 25, Number 4, pp. 629-649.

Russia Today (2015) "Kissinger: 'Breaking Russia has Become Objective for US,'" August 20, 2015.

Samuelson, R. J. (2004) "The World's Powerhouse," *Newsweek*, May 31, 2004.

Schaefer, D. B. and Kim B. A. (2008) "President Bush's Trip to Africa: Solidifying U.S. Partnerships with the Region," The Heritage Foundation, WebMemo #1817 on Africa, February 15, 2008.

Schiavenza, M. (2014) "How the BRICS New Development Bank Serves China's Interest," *International Business*, July 18, 2014.

Scott, M. (2025) "Here's the \$17 Trillion Reason Why the BRICS Summit This Week Is a Big Deal," *Bloomberg News*, July.

Servant, Jean-Christophe (2005) "China's Trade Safari in Africa," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English Version, May 11, 2005.

Shaikh, A. and Soni D. (2014) Press Release. Accessed from <http://regent.ac.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NUANCING-THE-NARRATIVE-OF-AFRICA-RISING.pdf>.

Sharma, R. (2012) "Broken BRICs," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December. Accessed from <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138219/ruchir-sharma/broken-brics>.

Shetty, S. (2011) "The Rise of the BRICS: What Does it Mean for Human Rights?" *The Huffington Post UK*, November 22, 2011.

Singh, S. (2013) "Future of Golden BRICS," *Strategic Analysis*, Volume 37, Issue 4, pp. 393-397, published online on August 2, 2013.

Snyder, M. (2010) "19 Facts About the Deindustrialization of America that Will Blow Your Mind on September 24th." Accessed from <http://theeconomiccollapseblog.com/archives/19-facts-about-the-deindustrialization-of-america-that-will-blow-your-mind>

Southall, Roger Melber, Henning eds., (2009) *A New Scramble for Africa? - Imperialism, Investment and Development*, Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Spears, C. (2009) "The Chinese – African Relationship: Can Sub-Saharan, Africans Think," *Brooks Foreign Review*, April 20, 2009.

Stevens, J. and Freemantle, S (2010) "Economics BRIC and Africa: South Africa: leading or lagging the BRICs' thrust in Africa?" July 6. Accessed from <http://www.yapschina.com/South%20Africa%20leading%20or%20lagging%20the%20BRICs%20thrust%20in%20Africa.pdf>

Stiglitz, E. J. (2013) "Inequality Is a Choice," *New York Times*, 13 October.

Stuenkel, O. (2015) *The BRICS and the Future of Global Order*. Lexington Books.

Swaran, Singh "Future of Golden BRICS," *Strategic Analysis*, Volume 37, Issue 4, 2013, pp. 393-397.

Taylor, I. (2014) *Africa Rising? BRICS – Diversifying Dependency*, Suffolk: James Currey.

te Velde, D. W. (2010) "The Global Financial Crisis and the Developing Countries: What

The Economist (2012) "Seeking Protection," *The Economist*, January 14, 2012.

The Economist (2013) "A Hopeful Continent," March 2, 2013.

The Economist (2015) "Devaluation of the Yuan: The Battle of Midpoint," August 15, 2015.

The Guardian (2009) "China Pledges \$10bn Concessional Loans to Africa," November 9, 2009.

The Guardian (2009) Sunday, November 8, 2015.

The Guardian (2015) "Brazilian President Under Fire as Tens of Thousands Protest in 200 cities," August 15, 2015.

Tulli, D. (2006). "China's Engagement in Africa: Scope Significant and Consequences." *Journal of African Studies*, Volume 44, Number 3, pp. 459-479.

UNCTAD, (2013) *The Rise of BRICS FDI and Africa*, Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Vhumbunu, H. C. (2014) "China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Programme: Forum on China Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) Drawing Lessons for African Integration from Accelerated Development in China, Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch Discussion Paper.

Wang, Hongying and Rosenau, N. James (2009) "China and Global Governance," *Asian Perspective*, Volume 33, Number 3, 2009, pp. 5-39.

Weitz, R. (2011) "Is BRICS a Real Bloc?" *The Diplomat*, April 22, 2011.

Wenping, He (2007) "The Balancing Act of China's Africa Policy," *China Security*, Volume 3, Number 3, Summer, pp. 23 – 40.

World Bank Press Release, (2013) "Africa Continues to Grow Strongly but Poverty and Inequality Remain Persistently High," October 7, 2013.

World Report 2015: China Events of 2014, Accessed from <http://www.htw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/china-and-tibet>.

Xinhua, (2009) "Former Premier Wen Jiabao Rejects Allegation of China, US Monopolizing World Affairs in Future," May 21, 2010.

Youngman, F. (2014) "China and Industrialization in Africa – the Implications for Botswana," Paper presented at the Conference on African industrialization and China-Africa cooperation, Centre for African Studies – Shanghai Normal University, June 2014.

Younis et., el. (2013) "Rising Powers in International Development: An Annotated Bibliography," Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex: Brighton.

Younis Musab with Constantine Jennifer, Yadav Akansha, Wach Elise, Shankland Alex, Navas-Aleman, Lizbeth (2013) *Rising Powers in International Development: An Annotated Bibliography*: Brighton, Institute of Development Studies.